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Evidence

Primary reports, advisories, papers and original records behind the Claims. Each record supports specific evidence rather than a whole Case by default.

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Evidence

SPILLWAY: Recipient provenance checks for agent tool calls

Prompt-injected or tool-derived text can try to redirect an agent action to a different recipient while preserving a plausible task narrative. SPILLWAY binds recipient selection to verified provenance instead of model prose. The paper reports eliminating attacker-targeted redirects in its selected benchmark tests, not a universal claim that every tool exfiltration path is closed. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.

Evidence

StealthyPoison: Manipulating LLM Agent Behavior through Procedural Poisoning of Third-Party Skills

Primary or origin disclosure used to qualify the underlying mechanism, stated prerequisites and limits. arXiv2611.12155: poisoned SKILL.md changes critical formula/constant/logic rather than jailbreak instructions, plus appends plausible retrieval examples. 566 skills, 26,262 competing listings, 5,985 pairs. With forced delivery ~31-33% output incorrect on several models; full registry top1 30.0% and end-to-end Qwen9.8%, Claude Code Opus4.8 49.4% retrieval,10.1% complete ASR, medical38.3%. Static scanners 0-0.7%; semantic judge45.8%.

Evidence

Study of presign authorization contamination in agent requirements

Signed agent requirement or policy manifests protect the bytes after signature, but a hostile input that changes what an operator selects before signing can place an unauthorized instruction inside a formally valid signed artifact. The controlled study emphasizes an admission and review boundary before cryptographic sealing. Signing itself cannot establish that the authorized human intended the content. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.

Evidence

Supabase documentation: Row Level Security

Official documentation explaining database row policies, authenticated and unauthenticated roles, and operation-specific checks. It supplies architectural context for the Lovable disclosure, not evidence of a compromise of Supabase infrastructure.

Evidence

Terence Tao: Math 2.0 (Caltech lecture slides)

Original 27-page slide deck from the October 2026 Caltech lecture. Page 9 discusses mathematical problem-solving as a proxy for long-term aims; page 20 uses a clearly hypothetical AI-designed treatment to illustrate potential divergence between formal checks, an evaluation outcome, and human understanding.