Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
Study of presign authorization contamination in agent requirements
Signed agent requirement or policy manifests protect the bytes after signature, but a hostile input that changes what an operator selects before signing can place an unauthorized instruction inside a formally valid signed artifact. The controlled study emphasizes an admission and review boundary before cryptographic sealing. Signing itself cannot establish that the authorized human intended the content. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
- Source role
- primary disclosure
Evidence record
Signed agent requirement or policy manifests protect the bytes after signature, but a hostile input that changes what an operator selects before signing can place an unauthorized instruction inside a formally valid signed artifact. The controlled study emphasizes an admission and review boundary before cryptographic sealing. Signing itself cannot establish that the authorized human intended the content. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
Claim-level citations (2)
- supportsSigned agent requirements can be compromised before authorization is sealed: The controlled study emphasizes an admission and review boundary before cryptographic sealing. Signing itself cannot establish that the authorized human intended the content.
Paper attack model: presign contamination; signed manifest controls
- supportsSigned agent requirements can be compromised before authorization is sealed: Signed agent requirement or policy manifests protect the bytes after signature, but a hostile input that changes what an operator selects before signing can place an unauthorized instruction inside a formally valid signed artifact.
Paper attack model: presign contamination; signed manifest controls