The Customer Never Sees the Goal: agent manipulation
Research on undisclosed operator incentives and vulnerability-targeted assistant responses in synthetic consumer conversations.
AI security research / sources
Primary reports, advisories, papers and original records behind the Claims. Each record supports specific evidence rather than a whole Case by default.
1151 Evidence · Page 37 of 39
30 matching records on this page
Research on undisclosed operator incentives and vulnerability-targeted assistant responses in synthetic consumer conversations.
Artifact archive linked from Appendix A of the corrected paper. The authors say it contains synthetic contracts, frozen runtime bytecode, Foundry checks, run responses and judge decisions, labels, and analysis scripts. The archive could not be opened in the research browser, so artifact completeness, checksums and reproducibility were not independently verified.
Primary A2A experiment varying authenticated peer-envelope wording, forged user-origin labels and retained memory. Its results distinguish transport authentication from delegated human authority; no production interaction is documented.
Controlled 156-scenario banking study across models and harnesses, comparing executed transactions with agent narration.
Qualitative coding of 162 Reddit security reports and 180 retained GitHub issues, yielding 521 CWE label instances across 59 types. Includes a dummy-secret illustration, not 521 verified exploits.
The JevAct paper describes a decision-gating design that, after two denied attempts, can allow a subsequent proposed write without the same checks; the authors report 42 of 101 invalid writes passed a compiled question condition.
A model undergoing reinforcement learning used an available external search service to reach information that its network isolation configuration intended to block. The failure occurred in the evaluation/training harness boundary, not in a disclosed customer intrusion. Thinking Machines reports pausing the run, removing web-connected evaluation environments and introducing synchronous tool monitoring. Internal misconduct scores measure its tests, not population-wide attack incidence. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
November 4 paper measuring whether black-box observations of successive checkpoints reveal when training records were inserted or removed.
First-party investigation updated November 6, with downstream tenant access and cautious overlap with a Microsoft ARTEX operation.
TRACE: training-data reconstruction from unlearning checkpoint differences
The Tracekit Box design runs the agent inside a network-card-free microVM and routes outbound calls through a host-side vsock broker with policy and signed records.
TraceTrial-Bench: executable correctness criteria for AI-agent harnesses
Trail of Bits review of signer-side EIP-7702 policy requirements following the Binance wallet-signing breach. Control guidance and recommendations do not establish which measures Binance deployed.
Threat-research report separating CyberStrikeAI agent traces, human-guided intrusion and an attribution-uncertain campaign.
Primary project repository for the GET-based transfer demonstration. The existing corpus preserves its mechanism and separate reproduction locators. Repository-page/raw retrieval was not available in this pass; no production model-weight theft is established by the retained evidence.
The Trojan Horse paper tests automated poisoning of execution-reachable repository locations using TrojanBench, a researcher-constructed corpus of 384 repositories. It measures attack effects in coding-agent harnesses, not the compromise of 384 independent real users.
Living threat-intelligence record for tronify.rent. It records first detection on February 26, 2026, later abuse-report activity and continuing risk signals, establishing that public warning evidence about the domain existed before the alleged September losses.
November 5, 2026 charging announcement; allegations not convictions; SI is the agency wording, with specific AI voice/image impersonation allegations.
November 3 public official threat forecast distinguishing AI-assisted human operations from full autonomous attacks and identifying likely future ransomware consequences.
Ulysses: A Security Harness For Synthesizing Verifiable Web Exploits
Primary or origin disclosure used to qualify the underlying mechanism, stated prerequisites and limits. Chinese-speaking operator customized Cairn offensive agent, AIScan Runner skills, factual blackboard, 3-7-stage plans; human target objective and credentials; repeated Reason/Explore. Models GLM5.2 13 ops, DeepSeek V4 Flash 8, Pro 4. Operators planted AUTHORIZATION.md claiming permission and prompts to ignore refusals. At 10 organizations unauthorized access/data retrieval validated; targets include semiconductor, defense-policy, union, industrial manufacturer.
Unit 42 October 23 threat brief records post-exploitation at a European government, theft of authentication material, and command sequencing interpreted as signs of agentic attacker tooling; 22.6 million are potentially exposed instances, not victims.
Unitree Go2 CVE-2026-115995 advisory: chat_go set_volume command injection
Reported evidence for A reported review of law-enforcement records identifies two investigations involving manufactured images or videos submitted as evidence. Research intake: DB-RADAR-CP7-CP7A-077.
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