AI security research / sources

Evidence

Primary reports, advisories, papers and original records behind the Claims. Each record supports specific evidence rather than a whole Case by default.

1005 Evidence · Page 31 of 34

Search & filter

On this page only.

Published sources

Evidence

Signed RAG embedding mismatch under tolerant verification

A signed RAG knowledge package can contain intact source text but attacker-manipulated embeddings. Numerical-tolerance checks between quantized vectors and full precision permitted materially different retrieval order. The study reports altered top-ranked search results in a controlled FAISS corpus and answer degradation in a local small-model test. A valid package signature did not prove the vectors matched the trusted embedding process. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.

Evidence

Smart Contract Intent & Vulnerability Dataset

Maintainer-published Web3 Software Engineering Lab dataset card describing more than 90,000 Ethereum and BSC contracts in a MySQL data dump, token intent labels, security-vulnerability labels, and label definitions. Fee, Reflection, Reward, Rebase and Mint encode token features or controls; their presence cannot alone establish fraud. ContractLens reports selecting a filtered, BSC-only 32,141-contract subset of an earlier smart-contract intent corpus. The card is evidence for label meanings and dataset availability, not an independent reproduction of ContractLens or validation of every annotation.

Evidence

SolBehave research and reproduction repository

The public SolBehave repository provides benchmark code and reproduction guidance for Solidity function regeneration, fuzzing and replay. Statements about availability of the full experimental data should be checked against actual downloadable artifacts, as repository text may be inconsistent.

Evidence

SPILLWAY: Recipient provenance checks for agent tool calls

Prompt-injected or tool-derived text can try to redirect an agent action to a different recipient while preserving a plausible task narrative. SPILLWAY binds recipient selection to verified provenance instead of model prose. The paper reports eliminating attacker-targeted redirects in its selected benchmark tests, not a universal claim that every tool exfiltration path is closed. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.

Evidence

Study of presign authorization contamination in agent requirements

Signed agent requirement or policy manifests protect the bytes after signature, but a hostile input that changes what an operator selects before signing can place an unauthorized instruction inside a formally valid signed artifact. The controlled study emphasizes an admission and review boundary before cryptographic sealing. Signing itself cannot establish that the authorized human intended the content. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.

Evidence

Supabase documentation: Row Level Security

Official documentation explaining database row policies, authenticated and unauthenticated roles, and operation-specific checks. It supplies architectural context for the Lovable disclosure, not evidence of a compromise of Supabase infrastructure.