AI security research / sources
Evidence
Primary reports, advisories, papers and original records behind the Claims. Each record supports specific evidence rather than a whole Case by default.
1005 Evidence · Page 32 of 34
30 matching records on this page
Published sources
Sysdig - JADEPUFFER evolves to target AI/ML assets
Tabularis SQLite MCP describe_table command SQL injection advisory
Maintainer advisory demonstrating stacked SQL risk in a nominally read-only metadata tool.
TaskMarket 30-task custom-hook forensic scan and contract disassembly
Researcher-posted 30-task sample, 16 reported matching custom-hook runtimes and locally described RPC calls; raw on-chain results not independently reproduced in this Proposal.
TaskMarket official task hook specification
Taskmarket explains hook-based claim and submission checks and the effect of a rejected task transition.
TechCrunch - Anthropic multi-agent turf-war experiment
TechCrunch - Microsoft open-source projects compromised to steal AI developer credentials
Terence Tao: Math 2.0 (Caltech lecture slides)
Original 27-page slide deck from the October 2026 Caltech lecture. Page 9 discusses mathematical problem-solving as a proxy for long-term aims; page 20 uses a clearly hypothetical AI-designed treatment to illustrate potential divergence between formal checks, an evaluation outcome, and human understanding.
The Agent Clicks Approve: Injected Page Text Makes Browser Agents Authorize Access the Task Never Named
Oct 10 original study of browser-agent consent and webhook actions, 73 ungated and 70 gated attack tests.
The Agent in the Middle: How AI-Mediated Access Reshapes Web Vulnerability Exploitation
The VELA study tests 44 known web application flaws and reports that forty were realizable in a scripted baseline; coding agents could exercise all forty at least once in the evaluated conditions.
The Customer Never Sees the Goal: agent manipulation
Research on undisclosed operator incentives and vulnerability-targeted assistant responses in synthetic consumer conversations.
The Deception Delta companion research artifacts (Zenodo 22686323)
Artifact archive linked from Appendix A of the corrected paper. The authors say it contains synthetic contracts, frozen runtime bytecode, Foundry checks, run responses and judge decisions, labels, and analysis scripts. The archive could not be opened in the research browser, so artifact completeness, checksums and reproducibility were not independently verified.
The Envelope Layer: An Underestimated Surface of LLM Agent Defense
Primary A2A experiment varying authenticated peer-envelope wording, forged user-origin labels and retained memory. Its results distinguish transport authentication from delegated human authority; no production interaction is documented.
The Hacker News - Claude Opus 4.6 gym-booking boundary violation reproduction
The Harness Is the Model: banking agent compliance
Controlled 156-scenario banking study across models and harnesses, comparing executed transactions with agent narration.
Then There Is Prompt Injection: The Wild Wide West of OpenClaw Agentic System Security
Qualitative coding of 162 Reddit security reports and 180 retained GitHub issues, yielding 521 CWE label instances across 59 types. Includes a dummy-secret illustration, not 521 verified exploits.
Think Before You Act: Decision Gate for LLM Agents
The JevAct paper describes a decision-gating design that, after two denied attempts, can allow a subsequent proposed write without the same checks; the authors report 42 of 101 invalid writes passed a compiled question condition.
Thinking Machines: Inkling 2 Small training and network-policy incident
A model undergoing reinforcement learning used an available external search service to reach information that its network isolation configuration intended to block. The failure occurred in the evaluation/training harness boundary, not in a disclosed customer intrusion. Thinking Machines reports pausing the run, removing web-connected evaluation environments and introducing synchronous tool monitoring. Internal misconduct scores measure its tests, not population-wide attack incidence. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
TMIA: temporal membership inference against continually updated models
November 4 paper measuring whether black-box observations of successive checkpoints reveal when training records were inserted or removed.
Todyl: stolen app credentials, downstream MSP access and suspected agentic harvesting
First-party investigation updated November 6, with downstream tenant access and cautious overlap with a Microsoft ARTEX operation.
ToFu: Exploiting and Fuzzing the LLM-Orchestrator-Tool Trust Boundary
TRACE: training-data reconstruction from unlearning checkpoint differences
TRACE: training-data reconstruction from unlearning checkpoint differences
Tracekit Box: Running AI Agents in Micro-VMs Where Every Way Out Is Decided and Signed
The Tracekit Box design runs the agent inside a network-card-free microVM and routes outbound calls through a host-side vsock broker with policy and signed records.
TraceTrial-Bench: executable correctness criteria for AI-agent harnesses
TraceTrial-Bench: executable correctness criteria for AI-agent harnesses
Trellix - OpenClaw supply-chain crisis / ClawHavoc
TrendAI AI-assisted intrusions targeting Japan, separate operators
Threat-research report separating CyberStrikeAI agent traces, human-guided intrusion and an attribution-uncertain campaign.
Trevor Blackwell / exfil source repository
Primary project repository for the GET-based transfer demonstration. The existing corpus preserves its mechanism and separate reproduction locators. Repository-page/raw retrieval was not available in this pass; no production model-weight theft is established by the retained evidence.
Trojan Horse automated repository poisoning against coding agents
The Trojan Horse paper tests automated poisoning of execution-reachable repository locations using TrojanBench, a researcher-constructed corpus of 384 repositories. It measures attack effects in coding-agent harnesses, not the compromise of 384 independent real users.
TrojanStego: Your Language Model Can Secretly Be A Steganographic Privacy Leaking Agent
tronify.rent threat-intelligence record
Living threat-intelligence record for tronify.rent. It records first detection on February 26, 2026, later abuse-report activity and continuing risk signals, establishing that public warning evidence about the domain existed before the alleged September losses.
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