vLLM applied trust-request-chat-template validation to Chat endpoints but failed to apply the same rejection to nested template kwargs arriving through its Responses API. The affected service must expose the OpenAI-compatible Responses route and pass caller-controlled chat_template_kwargs while request templates are disabled in configuration. A client…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
vLLM Responses endpoint accepted chat-template kwargs despite a disabled trust flag
vLLM applied trust-request-chat-template validation to Chat endpoints but failed to apply the same rejection to nested template kwargs arriving through its Responses API. A client could get a forbidden template evaluated and potentially combine the bypass with the separate Jinja CPU exhaustion mechanism.
The affected service must expose the OpenAI-compatible Responses route and pass caller-controlled chat_template_kwargs while request templates are disabled in configuration. Authentication was not bypassed; this is a route-policy mismatch, not a distinct demonstrated arbitrary code execution.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- patch available
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
The cited primary technical report or advisory supports the stated mechanism within its reported scope. The assessment does not infer a production breach, a victim count or a comparable impact score from a laboratory result. A maintainer or advisory names a patched release; that does not prove every deployed instance has updated. Boundary: The policy mismatch is between two OpenAI-compatible request routes.
Assessed Oct 29, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-CP23-VLLM-RESPONSES-TEMPLATE-1 · CLM-ENRICH-20261029-39 · vLLM Responses API template trust-policy bypass, CVE-2026-115918
At a glance
A client could get a forbidden template evaluated and potentially combine the bypass with the separate Jinja CPU exhaustion mechanism.
Read the implicationsAuthentication was not bypassed; this is a route-policy mismatch, not a distinct demonstrated arbitrary code execution.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
vLLM applied trust-request-chat-template validation to Chat endpoints but failed to apply the same rejection to nested template kwargs arriving through its Responses API.
The affected service must expose the OpenAI-compatible Responses route and pass caller-controlled chat_template_kwargs while request templates are disabled in configuration. A client could get a forbidden template evaluated and potentially combine the bypass with the separate Jinja CPU exhaustion mechanism.
Authentication was not bypassed; this is a route-policy mismatch, not a distinct demonstrated arbitrary code execution. Upgrade vLLM to 0.32.0 and enforce the same template trust decision at a shared request-normalization boundary for every endpoint.
Evidence interpretation and control boundary. The policy mismatch is between two OpenAI-compatible request routes. The Chat endpoint enforced a prohibition on caller-provided templates, while a nested chat_template_kwargs field in Responses bypassed that check and reached rendering. It can combine with the separate unbounded-Jinja workload, but this bypass itself does not prove any independent shell execution or authentication failure. Normalize both routes into one enforced template-authority decision.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Step
- 02
Step
- 03
Step
Claims & evidence
CLM-ENRICH-20261029-39The vLLM Responses API advisory reports that nested chat_template_kwargs escaped the same trust_request_chat_template restriction enforced by other chat routes, allowing forbidden request templates to reach rendering.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsvLLM Responses API template trust-policy bypass, CVE-2026-115918primary disclosure
GHSA-x567-49g5-p4cf: trust-request-chat-template, /v1/responses and affected versions
CLM-CP23-VLLM-RESPONSES-TEMPLATE-1vLLM applied trust-request-chat-template validation to Chat endpoints but failed to apply the same rejection to nested template kwargs arriving through its Responses API. The affected service must expose the OpenAI-compatible Responses route and pass caller-controlled chat_template_kwargs while request templates are disabled in configuration. A client could get a forbidden template evaluated and potentially combine the bypass with the separate Jinja CPU exhaustion mechanism.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsvLLM Responses API template trust-policy bypass, CVE-2026-115918primary disclosure
GHSA-x567-49g5-p4cf: trust-request-chat-template, /v1/responses and affected versions
Implications
A client could get a forbidden template evaluated and potentially combine the bypass with the separate Jinja CPU exhaustion mechanism.
Controls and mitigations
- Upgrade vLLM to 0.32.0 and enforce the same template trust decision at a shared request-normalization boundary for every endpoint.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Authentication was not bypassed; this is a route-policy mismatch, not a distinct demonstrated arbitrary code execution.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Oct 29, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 202