Case · DiggingBeagle record

PolicySniff reads agent approval-policy state through shared-GPU timing signals

A colocated observer classifies a target agent's concealed approval rules from GPU timing while receiving neither its prompt nor its model responses.

Scope

Calibrated A100 MIG and quantized gpt-oss-120b experiments using known candidate policies and task families; not a demonstrated cross-provider breach.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade C
Remediation
none known
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

A frozen classifier identifies policy states above chance in the test environment, with intrusive probe slowdown and no demonstrated arbitrary secret extraction. Classified as research_demonstration with exploit status demonstrated. Evidence grade C reflects the original paper or maintainer advisory and its stated limitations, not an independent audit of all deployments. Comparable realized harm is not established, so impact stays unrated; remediation status none_known is limited to the cited experiment or affected software version. New source-specific boundary: The same probing that provides a stronger policy fingerprint can impose measurable service slowdown, making inference accuracy and attack observability coupled rather than independent.

Assessed Nov 15, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Entry or starting condition

    An attacker can run calibrated GPU probes in the same A100 MIG environment as a victim agent inference workload.

    Boundary: attacker or research precondition

  2. 02

    Crossing the relevant boundary

    Shared GPU execution timing carries a signal correlated with one of several known hidden authorization conditions.

    Boundary: mechanism and authorization boundary

  3. 03

    Observed or reported result

    A frozen classifier identifies policy states above chance in the test environment, with intrusive probe slowdown and no demonstrated arbitrary secret extraction.

    Boundary: measured outcome and evidentiary limit

Claims & evidence

CLM-ENR250-12In the paper's calibrated A100 MIG setup, rapid 1 ms probes produced about 93.75 percent policy-classification accuracy in the measured configuration. The attack requires a co-resident timing observer, a restricted set of known policy candidates and frequent measurements; those prerequisites differ from recovering an arbitrary private system prompt.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-POLICYSNIFF-GPU-TIMING-01Authors report 94.17 percent exact-task balanced policy-state accuracy over 120 clusters and 88.82 percent accuracy even when visible tool actions agree, although continuous probing slows victim execution 4.71 times.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-POLICYSNIFF-GPU-TIMING-02The attacker benchmarks policy variants, holds the victim's public task suffix constant and infers the active internal approval condition from interference with scheduled observer kernels in a shared accelerator.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R246-POLICYSNIFF-GPU-TIMING-BOUNDARYThe PolicySniff paper reports that continuous probing increases median victim latency by 4.71 times, whereas adding a 5 ms gap reduces slowdown to 1.52 times while reducing policy inference accuracy to 58.33 percent in the evaluated cadence experiment.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The attacker already knows the small hypothesis set and shares controlled hardware; this is not arbitrary system-prompt reconstruction or an unobtrusive production side channel.
  • No evidence here establishes the number of production victims or a broader failure rate outside the cited evaluation.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 251