PAGE404 studies a less visible part of GPU multi-tenancy: metadata and driver work associated with unified-memory page migration on NVIDIA GH200 systems. Even if MIG partitions separate their direct memory allocations, selected migration counters and host driver processing may still be shared. The research demonstrates two different channels with distinct…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
PAGE404 observes two distinct GH200 GPU isolation side channels
Researchers show shared GPU page-migration counters and driver scheduling can cross GH200 MIG tenant boundaries despite isolated GPU memory.
arXiv:2610.20962, NVIDIA GH200 partitioned MIG experiments under controlled colocated processes.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
PAGE404's primary paper includes controlled GH200 MIG covert-channel measurements, driver-timing observations and selected-model inference accuracy. The hardware attack setup was demonstrated, but no cloud victim, reported NVIDIA patch, plaintext theft or proof of universal applicability to all GPUs is provided. Impact is left unbanded.
Assessed Oct 18, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-CP13-PAGE404-TIMING · CLM-CP13-PAGE404-COUNTER · CLM-ENRICH-PAGE404-PASSIVE-LIMIT · PAGE404: GPU memory isolation metadata side channels
At a glance
Partitioning user memory does not necessarily partition metadata counters and driver scheduling. These two channels warrant different mitigations and threat models because the first needs a communicating sender and the second is workload fingerprinting under selected distributions. Shared hardware performance optimization creates the observable resource…
Read the implicationsNo reported live cloud victim or published GPU security fix in the study. Passive-channel reliability under mixed unseen workloads and different hardware remains unproven.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
PAGE404 studies a less visible part of GPU multi-tenancy: metadata and driver work associated with unified-memory page migration on NVIDIA GH200 systems. Even if MIG partitions separate their direct memory allocations, selected migration counters and host driver processing may still be shared. The research demonstrates two different channels with distinct prerequisites, not a general ability to read another tenant's VRAM.
In the first experiment, a cooperative sender and receiver placed in separate MIG instances encode information through shared migration-counter occupancy. Under specific settings, the paper reports approximately 8.5 kilobits per second with one counter set and 15.5 kilobits per second with two. That is a cooperative covert channel. It does not mean an unrelated victim's secret prompt was automatically stolen.
In the second, a passive observer measures delays in its own migrations while another tenant runs inference. Selected experiments inferred workload classes and approximate output lengths, but the communication setup succeeded in only about half the reported runs. Classification results are sensitive to tested models, host load and environment; they are not plaintext reconstruction. The finding matters for accelerator isolation because resource scheduling and metadata can leak information even when data pages are partitioned. Independent cloud-wide exploitation, other GPU families and a verified vendor fix remain unestablished.
Mechanism and trust boundary
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Claims & evidence
CLM-CP13-PAGE404-TIMINGTiming a tenant's own page migrations through shared driver processing can correlate with another tenant's LLM workload; selected classifier and token-length results are metadata inference, not plaintext extraction.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsPAGE404: GPU memory isolation metadata side channelsprimary disclosure
Driver timing channel and LLM workload inference experiments
CLM-CP13-PAGE404-COUNTERShared page-migration counters can carry a cooperative cross-MIG covert channel; the paper reports roughly 8.5 kbps for one set and 15.5 kbps for two sets under chosen conditions.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsPAGE404: GPU memory isolation metadata side channelsprimary disclosure
Access-counter mapping and covert-channel throughput tests
CLM-ENRICH-PAGE404-PASSIVE-LIMITThe passive shared-driver timing channel succeeded in roughly half the paper's experimental runs, and its selected LLM classifier inferred workload class rather than extracting readable prompts or weights.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsPAGE404: GPU memory isolation metadata side channelsprimary disclosure
Shared driver timing evaluation, reliability caveat and Table III LLM classifier
Implications
Partitioning user memory does not necessarily partition metadata counters and driver scheduling. These two channels warrant different mitigations and threat models because the first needs a communicating sender and the second is workload fingerprinting under selected distributions. Shared hardware performance optimization creates the observable resource rather than malicious prompt content.
Controls and mitigations
- Evaluate partitioning or scheduling of migration counters and common driver paths, then benchmark residual cross-tenant signal and throughput costs on GH200 hardware.
- For confidential workloads, test actual workload fingerprinting under mixed unseen traffic rather than assuming that memory address isolation hides execution metadata.
Unknowns and contradictions
- No reported live cloud victim or published GPU security fix in the study.
- Passive-channel reliability under mixed unseen workloads and different hardware remains unproven.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Oct 18, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 171