Case · DiggingBeagle record

PAGE404 observes two distinct GH200 GPU isolation side channels

Researchers show shared GPU page-migration counters and driver scheduling can cross GH200 MIG tenant boundaries despite isolated GPU memory.

Scope

arXiv:2610.20962, NVIDIA GH200 partitioned MIG experiments under controlled colocated processes.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

PAGE404's primary paper includes controlled GH200 MIG covert-channel measurements, driver-timing observations and selected-model inference accuracy. The hardware attack setup was demonstrated, but no cloud victim, reported NVIDIA patch, plaintext theft or proof of universal applicability to all GPUs is provided. Impact is left unbanded.

Assessed Oct 18, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

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Claims & evidence

CLM-CP13-PAGE404-TIMINGTiming a tenant's own page migrations through shared driver processing can correlate with another tenant's LLM workload; selected classifier and token-length results are metadata inference, not plaintext extraction.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-CP13-PAGE404-COUNTERShared page-migration counters can carry a cooperative cross-MIG covert channel; the paper reports roughly 8.5 kbps for one set and 15.5 kbps for two sets under chosen conditions.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-ENRICH-PAGE404-PASSIVE-LIMITThe passive shared-driver timing channel succeeded in roughly half the paper's experimental runs, and its selected LLM classifier inferred workload class rather than extracting readable prompts or weights.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Partitioning user memory does not necessarily partition metadata counters and driver scheduling. These two channels warrant different mitigations and threat models because the first needs a communicating sender and the second is workload fingerprinting under selected distributions. Shared hardware performance optimization creates the observable resource rather than malicious prompt content.

Controls and mitigations

  • Evaluate partitioning or scheduling of migration counters and common driver paths, then benchmark residual cross-tenant signal and throughput costs on GH200 hardware.
  • For confidential workloads, test actual workload fingerprinting under mixed unseen traffic rather than assuming that memory address isolation hides execution metadata.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • No reported live cloud victim or published GPU security fix in the study.
  • Passive-channel reliability under mixed unseen workloads and different hardware remains unproven.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 18, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 171