The OracleDB Vector Store node interpolated the metadata filter name into a SQL identifier even when the name originated from untrusted workflow input. The affected workflow had to route external data, for example a webhook expression, into a dynamic Metadata Filter Name while using Oracle database credentials. A crafted name could change the generated…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
n8n Oracle vector metadata identifiers became SQL syntax
The OracleDB Vector Store node interpolated the metadata filter name into a SQL identifier even when the name originated from untrusted workflow input. A crafted name could change the generated query and access data with the node credential authority.
Scope
The affected workflow had to route external data, for example a webhook expression, into a dynamic Metadata Filter Name while using Oracle database credentials. The disclosed path is conditional on a specific vector-store configuration; no exploitation of actual customer records was reported.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- patch available
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
The cited primary technical report or advisory supports the stated mechanism within its reported scope. The assessment does not infer a production breach, a victim count or a comparable impact score from a laboratory result. A maintainer or advisory names a patched release; that does not prove every deployed instance has updated. Boundary: The trust boundary is the SQL identifier, not the value of an ordinary parameter: dynamic metadata field names can be constructed from untrusted workflow expressions and joined into a query under the configured Oracle service identity.
Assessed Oct 29, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-CP23-N8N-ORACLE-VECTOR-SQL-1 · CLM-ENRICH-20261029-23 · n8n Oracle vector-store metadata SQL injection advisory
At a glance
A crafted name could change the generated query and access data with the node credential authority.
Read the implicationsThe disclosed path is conditional on a specific vector-store configuration; no exploitation of actual customer records was reported.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
The OracleDB Vector Store node interpolated the metadata filter name into a SQL identifier even when the name originated from untrusted workflow input.
The affected workflow had to route external data, for example a webhook expression, into a dynamic Metadata Filter Name while using Oracle database credentials. A crafted name could change the generated query and access data with the node credential authority.
The disclosed path is conditional on a specific vector-store configuration; no exploitation of actual customer records was reported. Upgrade the affected n8n branch, restrict metadata field names to trusted identifiers and limit Oracle service account permissions.
Evidence interpretation and control boundary. The trust boundary is the SQL identifier, not the value of an ordinary parameter: dynamic metadata field names can be constructed from untrusted workflow expressions and joined into a query under the configured Oracle service identity. Binding user-provided values alone cannot secure an SQL identifier assembled as syntax. The affected node and service account configuration determine the realistic read or mutation scope.
Mechanism and trust boundary
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Step
- 02
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Claims & evidence
CLM-ENRICH-20261029-23The n8n OracleDB vector-store advisory describes an attacker-influenced metadata-filter name being placed into SQL identifier syntax, bypassing intended separation between workflow input and database query structure.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsn8n Oracle vector-store metadata SQL injection advisoryprimary disclosure
GHSA-2x68-96jw-5r6c: OracleDB Vector Store metadata filter, query construction, fixed versions
CLM-CP23-N8N-ORACLE-VECTOR-SQL-1The OracleDB Vector Store node interpolated the metadata filter name into a SQL identifier even when the name originated from untrusted workflow input. The affected workflow had to route external data, for example a webhook expression, into a dynamic Metadata Filter Name while using Oracle database credentials. A crafted name could change the generated query and access data with the node credential authority.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsn8n Oracle vector-store metadata SQL injection advisoryprimary disclosure
GHSA-2x68-96jw-5r6c: OracleDB Vector Store metadata filter, query construction, fixed versions
Implications
A crafted name could change the generated query and access data with the node credential authority.
Controls and mitigations
- Upgrade the affected n8n branch, restrict metadata field names to trusted identifiers and limit Oracle service account permissions.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The disclosed path is conditional on a specific vector-store configuration; no exploitation of actual customer records was reported.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Oct 29, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 202