Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
OmniRoute patch: block private SearXNG search destinations from caller input
Code diff separating user-selected public SearXNG endpoints from operator-managed private connectors.
- Published
- Nov 14, 2026
- Source role
- patch commit artifact
Evidence record
Code diff separating user-selected public SearXNG endpoints from operator-managed private connectors.
Claim-level citations (2)
- supportsA search tool could make server-side requests to internal hosts selected by an outside caller: OmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context. The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.
OmniRoute commit 49a288e, SearXNG caller base URL, DNS resolution and redirect validation
- supportsA search tool could make server-side requests to internal hosts selected by an outside caller: This is a documented code-level SSRF boundary, not evidence that cloud metadata or a customer secret was actually extracted. Reported exploitability still depends on how the route is exposed and what the server can reach. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations