OmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context. The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
A search tool could make server-side requests to internal hosts selected by an outside caller
OmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context.
Public disclosure: Nov 14, 2026
The service accepts a /v1/search call whose provider_options can contain a caller-chosen baseUrl.
At a glance
The caller-controlled URL is promoted into server network authority and can bypass the intended search destination boundary.
Read the implicationsThe evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
OmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context.
The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.
This is a documented code-level SSRF boundary, not evidence that cloud metadata or a customer secret was actually extracted. Reported exploitability still depends on how the route is exposed and what the server can reach.
The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Starting condition
The service accepts a /v1/search call whose provider_options can contain a caller-chosen baseUrl.
Boundary: precondition and attacker capability
- 02
Trust boundary crossed or evaluated
The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.
Boundary: mechanism
- 03
Observed consequence
The caller-controlled URL is promoted into server network authority and can bypass the intended search destination boundary.
Boundary: observed effect and limitations
Claims & evidence
CLM-NOV15-OMNISEARX-MECHOmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context. The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: block private SearXNG search destinations from caller inputpatch commit artifact
OmniRoute commit 49a288e, SearXNG caller base URL, DNS resolution and redirect validation
CLM-NOV15-OMNISEARX-SCOPEThis is a documented code-level SSRF boundary, not evidence that cloud metadata or a customer secret was actually extracted. Reported exploitability still depends on how the route is exposed and what the server can reach. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: block private SearXNG search destinations from caller inputpatch commit artifact
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations
Implications
The caller-controlled URL is promoted into server network authority and can bypass the intended search destination boundary.
Controls and mitigations
- Enforce destination checks for every resolved IP and redirect, including DNS changes and IPv4/IPv6 private ranges.
- Keep trusted operator-managed endpoints on a separate policy path from caller-supplied URLs, and restrict outbound traffic from the search worker.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250