Case · DiggingBeagle record

A search tool could make server-side requests to internal hosts selected by an outside caller

OmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context.

Public disclosure: Nov 14, 2026

Scope

The service accepts a /v1/search call whose provider_options can contain a caller-chosen baseUrl.

UnratedAI role: AGAINST AIAssessment method

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Starting condition

    The service accepts a /v1/search call whose provider_options can contain a caller-chosen baseUrl.

    Boundary: precondition and attacker capability

  2. 02

    Trust boundary crossed or evaluated

    The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.

    Boundary: mechanism

  3. 03

    Observed consequence

    The caller-controlled URL is promoted into server network authority and can bypass the intended search destination boundary.

    Boundary: observed effect and limitations

Claims & evidence

CLM-NOV15-OMNISEARX-MECHOmniRoute allowed a request-level SearXNG base URL to control the destination used by its search provider. When unauthenticated or lower-trust users could supply this URL, the server might reach loopback or LAN services from its privileged network context. The patch validates publicly routable destinations, DNS answers and redirect hops for caller-controlled search targets. It separately permits private SearXNG instances saved by the operator, reflecting the difference between approved connectors and an untrusted request parameter.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-NOV15-OMNISEARX-SCOPEThis is a documented code-level SSRF boundary, not evidence that cloud metadata or a customer secret was actually extracted. Reported exploitability still depends on how the route is exposed and what the server can reach. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

The caller-controlled URL is promoted into server network authority and can bypass the intended search destination boundary.

Controls and mitigations

  • Enforce destination checks for every resolved IP and redirect, including DNS changes and IPv4/IPv6 private ranges.
  • Keep trusted operator-managed endpoints on a separate policy path from caller-supplied URLs, and restrict outbound traffic from the search worker.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250