Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
Flowise Custom Function subpath import SSRF bypass
Researcher technical reproduction of a subpath import bypassing mocked HTTP client restrictions in a Flowise custom-function VM.
- Published
- Nov 13, 2026
- Source role
- primary disclosure
Evidence record
Researcher technical reproduction of a subpath import bypassing mocked HTTP client restrictions in a Flowise custom-function VM.
Claim-level citations (2)
- supportsA Flowise custom function could import an HTTP client by subpath and bypass an exact-name security wrapper: Flowise Custom Function nodes run user-authored JavaScript inside a NodeVM. Selected HTTP client module names are replaced by safer wrappers, but requiring node-fetch through its package subpath could reach a real implementation rather than the intended mock. The technical report demonstrates server-side requests to destinations that would otherwise be blocked, conditional on permissions to create or modify a custom flow. This is a tool sandbox policy mismatch, not an anonymous exploit by every chat visitor.
Researcher Flowise subpath-import reproduction, node-fetch/lib/index.js and private network requests
- supportsA Flowise custom function could import an HTTP client by subpath and bypass an exact-name security wrapper: The published advisory covers affected builds through 3.1.4 and does not establish real credential theft. Network policy remains a necessary boundary even when a library-level import filter appears enabled. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations