Flowise Custom Function nodes run user-authored JavaScript inside a NodeVM. Selected HTTP client module names are replaced by safer wrappers, but requiring node-fetch through its package subpath could reach a real implementation rather than the intended mock. The technical report demonstrates server-side requests to destinations that would otherwise be…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
A Flowise custom function could import an HTTP client by subpath and bypass an exact-name security wrapper
Flowise Custom Function nodes run user-authored JavaScript inside a NodeVM. Selected HTTP client module names are replaced by safer wrappers, but requiring node-fetch through its package subpath could reach a real implementation rather than the intended mock.
Public disclosure: Nov 13, 2026
An authenticated flow author can create or update a custom JavaScript function that imports dependencies.
At a glance
A subpath alias resolves around an exact-module-name mock and accesses a less restricted HTTP client.
Read the implicationsThe evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
Flowise Custom Function nodes run user-authored JavaScript inside a NodeVM. Selected HTTP client module names are replaced by safer wrappers, but requiring node-fetch through its package subpath could reach a real implementation rather than the intended mock.
The technical report demonstrates server-side requests to destinations that would otherwise be blocked, conditional on permissions to create or modify a custom flow. This is a tool sandbox policy mismatch, not an anonymous exploit by every chat visitor.
The published advisory covers affected builds through 3.1.4 and does not establish real credential theft. Network policy remains a necessary boundary even when a library-level import filter appears enabled.
The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Starting condition
An authenticated flow author can create or update a custom JavaScript function that imports dependencies.
Boundary: precondition and attacker capability
- 02
Trust boundary crossed or evaluated
The technical report demonstrates server-side requests to destinations that would otherwise be blocked, conditional on permissions to create or modify a custom flow. This is a tool sandbox policy mismatch, not an anonymous exploit by every chat visitor.
Boundary: mechanism
- 03
Observed consequence
A subpath alias resolves around an exact-module-name mock and accesses a less restricted HTTP client.
Boundary: observed effect and limitations
Claims & evidence
CLM-NOV15-FLOWISESUB-MECHFlowise Custom Function nodes run user-authored JavaScript inside a NodeVM. Selected HTTP client module names are replaced by safer wrappers, but requiring node-fetch through its package subpath could reach a real implementation rather than the intended mock. The technical report demonstrates server-side requests to destinations that would otherwise be blocked, conditional on permissions to create or modify a custom flow. This is a tool sandbox policy mismatch, not an anonymous exploit by every chat visitor.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsFlowise Custom Function subpath import SSRF bypassprimary disclosure
Researcher Flowise subpath-import reproduction, node-fetch/lib/index.js and private network requests
CLM-NOV15-FLOWISESUB-SCOPEThe published advisory covers affected builds through 3.1.4 and does not establish real credential theft. Network policy remains a necessary boundary even when a library-level import filter appears enabled. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsFlowise Custom Function subpath import SSRF bypassprimary disclosure
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations
Implications
A subpath alias resolves around an exact-module-name mock and accesses a less restricted HTTP client.
Controls and mitigations
- Normalize module specifiers and deny unreviewed package subpaths at the sandbox boundary.
- Restrict worker egress to approved destinations and prevent access to metadata and internal control planes regardless of JavaScript module import.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250