Case · DiggingBeagle record

Vulnerability-preserving code rewrites evade CodeQL taint tracking in a controlled study

An LLM guided by known static-analysis alerts made apparently ordinary JavaScript rewrites that preserved unsafe flows while removing some CodeQL warnings.

Scope

172 originally detected JavaScript source-to-sink flows and 514 valid controlled rewrite attempts, with no confirmed malicious software delivery.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
evaluation
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
none known
AI role
WITH AI
Basis and provenance

The original alert disappears for 26.2 percent of 172 initially detected flows within three tries; manual and controlled tests still reproduce the unsafe flow. Classified as evaluation with exploit status demonstrated. Evidence grade B reflects the original paper or maintainer advisory and its stated limitations, not an independent audit of all deployments. Comparable realized harm is not established, so impact stays unrated; remediation status none_known is limited to the cited experiment or affected software version. New source-specific boundary: Independent exploit replay and source-to-sink checks are needed to show that a scanner-silent rewrite still permits the original unauthorized effect.

Assessed Nov 15, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Entry or starting condition

    A defender has a JavaScript source-to-sink vulnerability already flagged by CodeQL.

    Boundary: attacker or research precondition

  2. 02

    Crossing the relevant boundary

    An alert-aware LLM makes a plausible maintenance rewrite that moves tainted data through a gap in the analyzer model while preserving unsafe runtime behavior.

    Boundary: mechanism and authorization boundary

  3. 03

    Observed or reported result

    The original alert disappears for 26.2 percent of 172 initially detected flows within three tries; manual and controlled tests still reproduce the unsafe flow.

    Boundary: measured outcome and evidentiary limit

Claims & evidence

CLM-ENR250-04The researchers attribute 43 of 70 successful vulnerability-preserving scanner-evasion rewrites to a WHATWG URL parser modeling gap and report that 64 of those 70 rewrites pass through APIs that CodeQL models at least in part. This is a specific source-to-sink coverage problem, not evidence that 43 deployed applications were compromised.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-CODEQL-ALERT-SILENCING-01Within three tries, the researchers silenced a targeted alert for 26.2 percent of the initially detected flows; alert-unaware benign rewrites silenced none of 516 control attempts.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-CODEQL-ALERT-SILENCING-02A model receives a vulnerable code fragment and the associated warning, then makes bounded maintenance-style edits while researchers check whether the original runtime flow remains and CodeQL stops reporting that specific path.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R246-CODEQL-ALERT-SILENCING-BOUNDARYOf the 70 verified alert-silencing rewrites, seven still produced another finding under the same CodeQL rule; suppressing the targeted source-to-sink flow was therefore not equivalent to clearing every finding in the function.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The denominator is a selected known-alert benchmark, not all real vulnerabilities or all source analyzers. Seven successful targeted rewrites retained another same-rule finding, so a silent targeted path is not proof of a clean function.
  • No evidence here establishes the number of production victims or a broader failure rate outside the cited evaluation.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 251