Case · DiggingBeagle record

Veritas found agent benchmarks awarding credit to materially wrong outcomes

A benchmark score can be internally repeatable without checking that the task was accomplished. Veritas tested existing grading code by constructing executable counterexamples rather than relying on impressions from model explanations. Several widely used agent evaluations accepted defective actions or missed correct equivalents.

Scope

Audit of selected agent benchmark graders and experimental verifier generation; not evidence of manipulation by an identified leaderboard participant.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
evaluation
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
not applicable
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

Executed defective candidates substantiate grading failures on audited subsets; no global leaderboard inversion or real attacker is identified. An impact band is not assigned because the available Claims do not establish a comparable verified severity or quantified harm.

Assessed Nov 12, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    The researchers inspect official agent-task verifier logic and construct deliberately defective candidate outputs.

  2. 02

    Execution of those counterexamples reveals graders that award success without the required task effect.

  3. 03

    The proposed generated verifiers supply new execution checks, but their accuracy is itself evaluated on selected tasks.

Claims & evidence

CLM-R239-020-COREVeritas reported grading failures in 27/82 audited Agents’ Last Exam tasks, 57/146 tau2-bench tasks and 36/106 eligible DeepSWE tasks under executed counterexamples.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R239-021-VERIFIERThe same Veritas study reports variable gains from generated executable graders, including three stronger-model tests where its baseline outperformed the generated-verifier setup.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

An agent evaluation that cannot distinguish wrong behavior from completed work may reward unsafe automation.

Controls and mitigations

  • Use execution-backed task-specific validators, independent adjudication and deliberately wrong near-miss outputs before accepting agent completion metrics.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • Population-wide error rates, ranking changes and accuracy of auto-generated replacement graders under adversarial submissions remain uncertain.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 12, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 241