A benchmark score can be internally repeatable without checking that the task was accomplished. Veritas tested existing grading code by constructing executable counterexamples rather than relying on impressions from model explanations. Several widely used agent evaluations accepted defective actions or missed correct equivalents. The audit found 27 of 82…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
Veritas found agent benchmarks awarding credit to materially wrong outcomes
A benchmark score can be internally repeatable without checking that the task was accomplished. Veritas tested existing grading code by constructing executable counterexamples rather than relying on impressions from model explanations. Several widely used agent evaluations accepted defective actions or missed correct equivalents.
Audit of selected agent benchmark graders and experimental verifier generation; not evidence of manipulation by an identified leaderboard participant.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- evaluation
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
Executed defective candidates substantiate grading failures on audited subsets; no global leaderboard inversion or real attacker is identified. An impact band is not assigned because the available Claims do not establish a comparable verified severity or quantified harm.
Assessed Nov 12, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R239-020-CORE · CLM-R239-021-VERIFIER · Veritas executes counterexamples against six popular agent benchmark graders and documents systematic false passes
At a glance
An agent evaluation that cannot distinguish wrong behavior from completed work may reward unsafe automation.
Read the implicationsPopulation-wide error rates, ranking changes and accuracy of auto-generated replacement graders under adversarial submissions remain uncertain.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
A benchmark score can be internally repeatable without checking that the task was accomplished. Veritas tested existing grading code by constructing executable counterexamples rather than relying on impressions from model explanations. Several widely used agent evaluations accepted defective actions or missed correct equivalents.
The audit found 27 of 82 audited Agents’ Last Exam tasks and 57 of 146 audited tau2-bench tasks with discriminating failures. In one coding benchmark, 36 of 106 eligible tasks gave full credit after an entire patch hunk was removed. Its second contribution generates task-specific executable graders, but improvements vary by model and harness. Sample denominators are audited subsets, not the whole benchmark population; no global leaderboard reversal has been proved.
An agent evaluation that cannot distinguish wrong behavior from completed work may reward unsafe automation.
A separate contribution in the same Veritas paper compiles task-specific executable graders from allowed evidence and procedural rules. The authors report improvements in five of eight selected harness comparisons, but a stronger GPT-5.6 Sol baseline beat the generated-verifier harness in three comparisons. That is not evidence that Veritas always wins or that agreement with an existing flawed benchmark grader proves ground truth.
The denominators describe audited or eligible subsets, not all tasks in each benchmark. A defective verifier can invalidate a specific success claim without proving a complete leaderboard inversion. The follow-up should rerun archived agent outputs against human-certified effects and near-miss counterexamples, rather than rely on another model's optimistic verdict.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
The researchers inspect official agent-task verifier logic and construct deliberately defective candidate outputs.
- 02
Execution of those counterexamples reveals graders that award success without the required task effect.
- 03
The proposed generated verifiers supply new execution checks, but their accuracy is itself evaluated on selected tasks.
Claims & evidence
CLM-R239-020-COREVeritas reported grading failures in 27/82 audited Agents’ Last Exam tasks, 57/146 tau2-bench tasks and 36/106 eligible DeepSWE tasks under executed counterexamples.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsVeritas executes counterexamples against six popular agent benchmark graders and documents systematic false passesprimary disclosure
Section 5, benchmark-grader audit and counterexamples
CLM-R239-021-VERIFIERThe same Veritas study reports variable gains from generated executable graders, including three stronger-model tests where its baseline outperformed the generated-verifier setup.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsVeritas executes counterexamples against six popular agent benchmark graders and documents systematic false passesprimary disclosure
Generated Evaluator; results across coding harnesses and eight comparisons
Implications
An agent evaluation that cannot distinguish wrong behavior from completed work may reward unsafe automation.
Controls and mitigations
- Use execution-backed task-specific validators, independent adjudication and deliberately wrong near-miss outputs before accepting agent completion metrics.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Population-wide error rates, ranking changes and accuracy of auto-generated replacement graders under adversarial submissions remain uncertain.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 12, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 241