Reachy Mini BLE authentication state and command paths combined in root execution

Reachy Mini shared mutable BLE authentication state across sessions and accepted absolute-path command handling, allowing one untrusted interaction to influence another privileged action path.

JFrog reports a chain to root-level command execution in its tested robot environment. The report is a controlled exploit, not evidence every deployed robot was compromised.

The more severe Reachy Mini path crosses two separate privileges: BLE session authentication and the command/path behavior executed by the robot. JFrog describes shared mutable authentication state permitting one nearby client to influence another client's privileged action path, followed by unconfined absolute-path handling that reached root-level command execution in the tested configuration. This requires the relevant BLE access and session/race prerequisites; it is not an Internet-wide root exploit against every robot. Fixing the unrelated HTTP package installation path does not automatically repair shared BLE state. The evidence establishes a laboratory execution chain, not confirmed attacker activity on deployed robots.

This exploit combines state confusion and execution authority. Shared BLE authentication state lets one interaction affect the status applied to another, and an absolute-path command route can then invoke a privileged action under the robot's process permissions. A single global authenticated flag is not a substitute for session-bound proof. This differs from the separate unauthenticated Spaces installation API, where software deployment is exposed directly over HTTP; neither report establishes that all owners had an internet-reachable robot or were attacked.