Priors described a first_line identity action that moved five USDG to an InviteBond contract but did not debit the counter enforced by PRIORS_MAX_SPEND_USD. In a controlled demonstration, repeating the action transferred ten USDG while the session counter still recorded zero with a nominal zero-dollar cap. The configured limit and the blockchain balance had…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
Priors identity bonds spent funds while the session cap counter stayed at zero
An MCP finance tool did not include InviteBond transfers in its configured session spending limit.
Scope
Affected Priors MCP 0.12.x bond flow in a controlled test. Other daily controls can limit activity and no actual customer loss is established.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- fixed reported
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
The GHSA includes a controlled counter bypass and versioned patch. Separate daily limits and real customer exposure were not eliminated by the demonstration. Impact remains unrated because the scoped record does not establish a calibrated severity-to-impact-band mapping.
Assessed Oct 31, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-C26-PRIORS-IDENTITY-BOND-CAP-1 · Priors: identity bond excluded from agent session spending cap
At a glance
The blockchain transfers are real in a fork demonstration, but this is a ledger/counter mismatch, not a double-spend or proven theft.
Read the implicationsProduction deployments with a zero spending cap and successful bond payments were not enumerated.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
Priors described a first_line identity action that moved five USDG to an InviteBond contract but did not debit the counter enforced by PRIORS_MAX_SPEND_USD. In a controlled demonstration, repeating the action transferred ten USDG while the session counter still recorded zero with a nominal zero-dollar cap. The configured limit and the blockchain balance had diverged because the accounting boundary excluded a type of authorized transfer.
The advisory also notes that a distinct daily cap could still restrict the sequence; the result is not a blockchain double-spend and is not evidence of a stolen customer wallet. The fix in @priors/mcp 0.13.0 addressed the identity-bond path. This is separate from the earlier Priors borrow/bridge broadcast-accounting defect, which concerns missing transaction receipts and post-broadcast exceptions.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Step
- 02
Step
- 03
Step
Timeline
- Oct 29, 2026disclosure
Public disclosure
Claims & evidence
CLM-C26-PRIORS-IDENTITY-BOND-CAP-1The Priors advisory reports that two identity bond operations transferred ten USDG while a zero-dollar session spend cap still recorded zero.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsPriors: identity bond excluded from agent session spending capprimary disclosure
GHSA-43jv-qfcj-qhjh, first_line InviteBond reproduction and fix versions
Implications
The blockchain transfers are real in a fork demonstration, but this is a ledger/counter mismatch, not a double-spend or proven theft.
Controls and mitigations
- Apply spend caps to all outgoing value transfers, reconcile transaction receipts and update @priors/mcp to 0.13.0 or later.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Production deployments with a zero spending cap and successful bond payments were not enumerated.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Oct 31, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 208