Case · DiggingBeagle record

PraisonAI workflow AST allowlist admitted unsafe Python operations under an opt-in flag

PraisonAI job workflow parsing could execute restricted Python through a defective AST allowlist when job workflows were enabled.

Scope

PraisonAI installations with job workflows enabled and attacker influence over YAML job content; affected releases before 4.6.78. No verified public exploitation campaign.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade C
Remediation
fixed reported
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The advisory supports a conditional code-execution flaw; deployments without the enabled workflow path and real victim effects are unmeasured. Impact remains unrated because the scoped record does not establish a calibrated severity-to-impact-band mapping.

Assessed Oct 31, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Step

  2. 02

    Step

  3. 03

    Step

Timeline

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    disclosure

    Public disclosure

Claims & evidence

CLM-C26-PRAISON-AST-WORKFLOW-1GitHub’s reviewed GHSA-26mh-57q7-jfvr reports a broken Python AST sandbox in PraisonAI job workflows before 4.6.78, and identifies CVE-2026-61438.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

A GHSA with conflicting CVE aliases is one underlying issue until CNA records establish otherwise.

Controls and mitigations

  • Upgrade to the vendor-fixed build, require trusted workflow authors and enforce operating-system isolation beyond an AST checklist.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The alternate CVE identifier requires CNA-level reconciliation and must not count as another attack.
  • The effective OS identity used by a deployed job worker varies by operator configuration.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 31, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 208