A health-check error path in a Go model proxy returned upstream provider responses containing masked secret fragments to permitted health callers. The /v1/health handler probes external model services with the operator's API keys and forwards provider errors without sufficient redaction; the default authorization hook does not reject requests. The…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
pgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages
A health-check error path in a Go model proxy returned upstream provider responses containing masked secret fragments to permitted health callers.
Go LLM Library proxy 0.1.0/0.1.1 with health checks and credentials configured; access depends on the application Authorize hook.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- patch available
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
Errors could reveal fragments of API credentials; version 0.2.0 provides redaction, but full-key theft or downstream spending has not been shown. Classified as research_demonstration with exploit status demonstrated. Evidence grade B reflects the original paper or maintainer advisory and its stated limitations, not an independent audit of all deployments. Comparable realized harm is not established, so impact stays unrated; remediation status patch_available is limited to the cited experiment or affected software version. New source-specific boundary: Response exposure, the usability of a partial key, and verified misuse are separate outcomes; the advisory establishes a preventive rotation rationale, not observed theft.
Assessed Nov 15, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R245-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-01 · CLM-R245-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-02 · CLM-R246-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-BOUNDARY · CLM-ENR250-10 · pgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages (original advisory or patch)
At a glance
A partial key fragment is not evidence of full credential theft or unauthorized inference spending. The fixed-version discrepancy must be retained until module tags and commit history are reconciled. No evidence here establishes the number of production victims or a broader failure rate outside the cited evaluation.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
A health-check error path in a Go model proxy returned upstream provider responses containing masked secret fragments to permitted health callers.
The /v1/health handler probes external model services with the operator's API keys and forwards provider errors without sufficient redaction; the default authorization hook does not reject requests. The maintained advisory describes masked API-key fragments appearing in responses and calls 0.2.0 the first released fixed version, despite a conflicting pseudo-version in structured advisory metadata.
A partial key fragment is not evidence of full credential theft or unauthorized inference spending. The fixed-version discrepancy must be retained until module tags and commit history are reconciled.
A health endpoint is often treated as innocuous operational metadata, but the vulnerable proxy tested upstream model providers with real service credentials and forwarded their error strings to the caller. Some provider messages contained masked fragments of the key. The missing default authorization hook further widened who could see those errors if a deployment exposed the proxy. This is partial credential disclosure, not independently demonstrated reconstruction of a complete provider key.
Version metadata needs its own precise treatment. The advisory text names 0.2.0 as the first tagged fixed release, while the structured package metadata references a pseudo-version based on an earlier commit. That is a difference between a source revision and a published tag, not a reason to invent a v0.1.2 release. The security fix redacts sensitive fragments before returning provider failures; access checks alone still leave the formatting problem for authorized or compromised callers. Historical exposure calls for log and provider-key review rather than relying only on a fresh install.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Entry or starting condition
A network caller can invoke the pgEdge Go LLM proxy health route while provider credentials are configured.
Boundary: attacker or research precondition
- 02
Crossing the relevant boundary
The route tests upstream providers with real keys and returns provider error text without unconditional sanitization; a missing authorization hook may allow the request by default.
Boundary: mechanism and authorization boundary
- 03
Observed or reported result
Errors could reveal fragments of API credentials; version 0.2.0 provides redaction, but full-key theft or downstream spending has not been shown.
Boundary: measured outcome and evidentiary limit
Claims & evidence
CLM-ENR250-10The pgEdge advisory recommends reviewing and rotating API keys potentially revealed by the unauthenticated health response in addition to upgrading to the first published fixed release, 0.2.0. A code fix prevents new partial-key disclosures but cannot withdraw copies of diagnostic responses or revoke credentials already exposed.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportspgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages (original advisory or patch)primary disclosure
GHSA-8835-xmqj-354h, patch availability and workaround or credential-rotation guidance
CLM-R245-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-01The maintained advisory describes masked API-key fragments appearing in responses and calls 0.2.0 the first released fixed version, despite a conflicting pseudo-version in structured advisory metadata.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportspgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages (original advisory or patch)primary disclosure
Advisory impact, affected versions and conflicting patch metadata
CLM-R245-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-02The /v1/health handler probes external model services with the operator's API keys and forwards provider errors without sufficient redaction; the default authorization hook does not reject requests.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportspgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages (original advisory or patch)primary disclosure
Advisory health-probe response path and authorization default
CLM-R246-PGEDGE-GO-HEALTH-KEYS-BOUNDARYThe pgEdge advisory distinguishes an unpublished fixed pseudo-version from the first released fixed tag: its maintainer says 0.2.0 is the first fixed release and no v0.1.2 release was cut, despite structured metadata carrying a pseudo-version based on a July commit.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportspgEdge Go LLM health endpoint could return provider-key fragments in error messages (original advisory or patch)primary disclosure
GHSA-8835-xmqj-354h, Patches paragraph and structured patched-version metadata
Unknowns and contradictions
- A partial key fragment is not evidence of full credential theft or unauthorized inference spending. The fixed-version discrepancy must be retained until module tags and commit history are reconciled.
- No evidence here establishes the number of production victims or a broader failure rate outside the cited evaluation.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 251