Case · DiggingBeagle record

MobileProbe selects reachable UI injection points before evaluating mobile agents

MobileProbe shows that placing hostile UI content where a mobile agent will encounter it changes measured attack success, even before the payload is optimized.

Scope

83 constructed attacks in 12 Android applications, evaluated on Android 14 virtual machines across three agent configurations; no customer app victim is established.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
simulation
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
none known
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The tested agents perform the attacker objective in 85.1 to 86.3 percent of selected benchmark instances, with no measured real-account victim rate. Classified as simulation with exploit status demonstrated. Evidence grade B reflects the original paper or maintainer advisory and its stated limitations, not an independent audit of all deployments. Comparable realized harm is not established, so impact stays unrated; remediation status none_known is limited to the cited experiment or affected software version. New source-specific boundary: Attack success measured on a repackaged app must not be presented as the success rate for an attacker who controls only ordinary remote content in an unchanged application.

Assessed Nov 15, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Entry or starting condition

    An attacker can alter text or a dialog within an Android app that a mobile agent visits to complete a benign task.

    Boundary: attacker or research precondition

  2. 02

    Crossing the relevant boundary

    MobileProbe records legitimate trajectories, selects a reachable decision point and refines an instruction payload using surrogate scoring and execution feedback.

    Boundary: mechanism and authorization boundary

  3. 03

    Observed or reported result

    The tested agents perform the attacker objective in 85.1 to 86.3 percent of selected benchmark instances, with no measured real-account victim rate.

    Boundary: measured outcome and evidentiary limit

Claims & evidence

CLM-ENR250-07The 83 MobileProbe attack cases have two materially different attacker prerequisites: 44 use malicious user-generated material in otherwise available apps, while 39 use attacker-repackaged applications to display fabricated interface elements. The benchmark verifies selected actions and device states after execution, not just whether an agent repeated the attacker text.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-MOBILEPROBE-TRAJECTORY-ATTACK-01The paper reports 85.1, 86.3 and 85.1 percent completion of selected attacker objectives for three evaluated agents, materially above its specified static-template and zero-shot controls.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R245-MOBILEPROBE-TRAJECTORY-ATTACK-02Researchers observe a benign GUI trajectory, select editable text or fabricated-dialog surfaces near a real decision, generate and refine hostile instructions and then measure the simulated Android action rather than a verbal promise.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-R246-MOBILEPROBE-TRAJECTORY-ATTACK-BOUNDARYThe paper reports that removing evolutionary payload refinement reduces Gemini attack success from 85.1 percent to 28.5 percent; trajectory-aware placement and execution feedback are material parts of this selected benchmark, not incidental prompt wording.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The study preselects reachable vulnerable surfaces and task goals; it does not establish a general mobile-device compromise rate, loss of funds or delivery of a malicious application to real users.
  • No evidence here establishes the number of production victims or a broader failure rate outside the cited evaluation.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 251