Case · DiggingBeagle record

MCP-FSD validates filesystem access outside tools’ advertised scope

Isolated testing found 150 filesystem-boundary violations across a selected sample of MCP servers, including 136 disclosures of synthetic planted credential markers.

Scope

arXiv:2610.22301, sampled JavaScript/Python MCP registry servers, synthetic secrets and controlled process permissions.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
mitigation available
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The arXiv MCP-FSD paper directly reports 21,097 registry listings, selected runnable samples and 150 dynamically validated path-boundary violations with 136 planted credential matches. The screened candidate percentage is not a prevalence estimate for all servers. The mechanisms were measured in synthetic, local tests, with no proof of stolen production credentials or a single global patch.

Assessed Oct 18, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

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Claims & evidence

CLM-CP13-FSD-COUNTMCP-FSD dynamically confirmed 150 out-of-bound filesystem access failures in its selected runnable population, including 136 probes returning exact planted credentials.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-CP13-FSD-DENOMThe earlier 787/4,806 count is a capability-signal triage ratio, not vulnerability prevalence across the 21,097 discovered registry listings.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-CP13-FSD-PREREQDemonstrated direct MCP tool calls exercised the underlying server OS privileges; live agent prompt injection, actual stolen third-party credentials and public fleet exposure were not established by this experiment.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-ENRICH-MCP-FSD-DENOMThe 787 capability signals among 4,806 screened MCP candidates identify a triage set, not a 16.4 percent confirmed vulnerability prevalence; 150 dynamically validated failures form a separate selected denominator.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Tool-name admission protects only what the client thinks the tool will do. The server process may interpret a valid argument as a path outside the approved workspace and return the result as ordinary tool output. The two older Git MCP issues are specific examples of this larger semantic and OS permission mismatch, not additional newly exploited incidents.

Controls and mitigations

  • Run each MCP server with operating-system filesystem permissions limited to its declared workspace, treating tool descriptions as documentation rather than effective access controls.
  • Test schema-valid but out-of-scope paths with synthetic secrets and verify effects behind a real MCP client, distinguishing direct tool-call bugs from model-induced exploitation.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • Real client-mediated attack completion per tool and affected deployed revisions are not comprehensively confirmed.
  • The selected runnable subset should not be extrapolated to all MCP servers.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 18, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 171