Case · DiggingBeagle record

MCP Atlassian SSRF DNS pinning failed across an HTTP proxy

A proxy could resolve a caller-controlled hostname after a local address check.

Public disclosure: Nov 8, 2026

Scope

HTTP proxy is enabled and the attacker influences Atlassian service URL configuration. Local validation/pinning was undermined when a proxy re-resolved a trusted hostname; 0.24.1 constrains the trusted origin.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
patch available
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

Scoped Claim(s) link to SRC-2026-DB233-GHSA-3C6H-QWX8-HJCM; reviewed as vulnerability in research_demonstration. Only reported controlled behavior or proof-of-concept is established; no production victim or impact magnitude is measured.

Assessed Nov 10, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Precondition and trust context

    HTTP proxy is enabled and the attacker influences Atlassian service URL configuration.

  2. 02

    Crossed boundary

    Local validation/pinning was undermined when a proxy re-resolved a trusted hostname; 0.24.1 constrains the trusted origin.

  3. 03

    Observed limit

    Requires this proxy configuration; no observed cloud metadata disclosure.

Timeline

  1. Nov 8, 2026
    Event type unspecified

    Initial documented finding

    MCP Atlassian SSRF DNS pinning failed across an HTTP proxy

  2. Nov 8, 2026
    disclosure

    Public disclosure

Claims & evidence

CLM-DB233-ATL-GHSA-3C6H-QWX8-HJCM-01The GHSA-3c6h-qwx8-hjcm advisory documents that local validation/pinning was undermined when a proxy re-resolved a trusted hostname; 0.24.1 constrains the trusted origin.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-DB233-ATL-GHSA-3C6H-QWX8-HJCM-02The disclosed precondition is: HTTP proxy is enabled and the attacker influences Atlassian service URL configuration.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Controls and mitigations

  • Restrict Jira and Confluence service origins to operator-approved hosts and maintain outbound address policy across proxy resolution; use the reported 0.24.1 correction.
  • Check resolved destinations and redirects at the network egress boundary, not only before constructing a proxied request.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • Requires this proxy configuration; no observed cloud metadata disclosure.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 10, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 235