Case · DiggingBeagle record

MCP Atlassian HTTP authentication trusted caller-supplied URL and token headers

Untrusted headers could bypass the HTTP gate and redirect service requests.

Public disclosure: Nov 8, 2026

Scope

Shared HTTP transport accepts client-supplied Atlassian service URL and token headers. Middleware treated nonempty headers as authentication, then could make off-origin requests with forwarded credentials. Version 0.24.1 ties origins to trusted configuration.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
patch available
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

Scoped Claim(s) link to SRC-2026-DB233-GHSA-RH5V-38GG-Q3JJ; reviewed as vulnerability in research_demonstration. Only reported controlled behavior or proof-of-concept is established; no production victim or impact magnitude is measured.

Assessed Nov 10, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Precondition and trust context

    Shared HTTP transport accepts client-supplied Atlassian service URL and token headers.

  2. 02

    Crossed boundary

    Middleware treated nonempty headers as authentication, then could make off-origin requests with forwarded credentials. Version 0.24.1 ties origins to trusted configuration.

  3. 03

    Observed limit

    Controlled requests, not verified credential theft or production access.

Timeline

  1. Nov 8, 2026
    Event type unspecified

    Initial documented finding

    MCP Atlassian HTTP authentication trusted caller-supplied URL and token headers

  2. Nov 8, 2026
    disclosure

    Public disclosure

Claims & evidence

CLM-DB233-ATL-GHSA-RH5V-38GG-Q3JJ-01The GHSA-rh5v-38gg-q3jj advisory documents that middleware treated nonempty headers as authentication, then could make off-origin requests with forwarded credentials. Version 0.24.1 ties origins to trusted configuration.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-DB233-ATL-GHSA-RH5V-38GG-Q3JJ-02The disclosed precondition is: Shared HTTP transport accepts client-supplied Atlassian service URL and token headers.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Controls and mitigations

  • Require server-side request authentication independent of Atlassian configuration headers and pin operator-approved destinations; upgrade to 0.24.1.
  • Discard caller-provided outbound origin overrides and avoid forwarding sensitive credentials across host boundaries.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • Controlled requests, not verified credential theft or production access.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 10, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 235