Removing an installed LobsterAI skill could direct recursive deletion outside that skill's managed directory. In issue 2793, the maintainer confirmed that the uninstall handler trusted an openclawSourceDir path from the skill's _meta.json file, which a downloaded package could supply itself. The field was intended to remember where an OpenClaw-synced skill…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
LobsterAI uninstall trusted a skill-controlled deletion directory
LobsterAI maintainers confirmed that an installed skill could supply openclawSourceDir inside _meta.json, which was used as a recursive deletion target during uninstall.
Local software supply-chain vulnerability affecting LobsterAI 2026.5.27 to 2026.9.23; requires installing and later uninstalling a crafted skill.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Exploitation
- not established
- Remediation
- fixed reported
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
The maintainer confirmed the bug and corrected affected versions on October 7; the October 12 closure is visible. Release availability was not independently checked, so this is a reported code fix, not verified deployment. Primary passages were inspected in this review, but the pinned contract supplies no grading rubric for A-D or the numeric impact bands; both remain ungraded. This is a source review, not an independent reproduction.
Assessed Oct 13, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-1 · CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-2 · CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-3 · LobsterAI security report: untrusted _meta.json path controls skill uninstall
At a glance
Agent skill review needs to inspect lifecycle metadata and deletion targets as well as executable instructions.
Read the implicationsThe earliest verified fixed binary and downstream package distribution require release verification. No production victim count or confirmed actual directory loss was supplied.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
Removing an installed LobsterAI skill could direct recursive deletion outside that skill's managed directory. In issue 2793, the maintainer confirmed that the uninstall handler trusted an openclawSourceDir path from the skill's _meta.json file, which a downloaded package could supply itself.
The field was intended to remember where an OpenClaw-synced skill originated. The ordinary installation path copied a downloaded package into the managed skills directory, including any supplied metadata. Later, uninstall treated the stored path as permission to remove another directory with the application's privileges. The security boundary was therefore package-controlled lifecycle metadata becoming a deletion target. No malicious instruction in SKILL.md needed to persuade the model.
The disclosure includes a material correction to affected scope. The reporter's October 5 description treated the problem as main-branch-only using obsolete v0.2.x tags. On October 7 the maintainer explained that LobsterAI used date-based releases and that versions 2026.5.27 through 2026.9.23 were affected. That maintainer correction rules out presenting released users as unaffected.
The maintainer reports changing uninstall to remove only the skill's own managed directory and removing openclawSourceDir from the synchronization path. The change was merged for the 2026.9.24 release branch, with regression and end-to-end testing reported. Issue closure on October 12 and a merged branch still do not independently prove distribution of a fixed binary. The cited record establishes a reported repair and affected release range, while actual customer losses and the first verified distributed fix remain unknown.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Installed metadata
A downloaded skill can carry _meta.json containing an attacker-selected openclawSourceDir; the normal copy path preserves it.
Boundary: A package-controlled file impersonates host-generated lifecycle metadata.
- 02
Routine uninstall
The user later removes the skill, and the delete handler reads the path from that file.
Boundary: A normal removal action promotes untrusted metadata into deletion authority.
- 03
Recursive deletion target
The vulnerable handler removes the named directory with application-user permissions, beyond the intended skill root.
Boundary: The dangerous boundary is lifecycle path selection, not model compliance with SKILL.md.
Timeline
- Oct 5, 2026disclosure
Public disclosure
Claims & evidence
CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-1LobsterAI maintainers confirmed that an installed skill could supply openclawSourceDir inside _meta.json, which was used as a recursive deletion target during uninstall.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsLobsterAI security report: untrusted _meta.json path controls skill uninstallprimary disclosure
Issue #2793, maintainer confirmation and explanation of _meta.json-controlled delete.
CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-2Maintainers identified affected date-version releases from 2026.5.27 through 2026.9.23 and a merged correction planned for 2026.9.24; a merged commit alone does not prove a fixed release was distributed.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsLobsterAI security report: untrusted _meta.json path controls skill uninstallprimary disclosure
Issue #2793, maintainer October 7 response and October 12 activity.
CLM-R4-LOBSTER-DELETION-3The initial October 5 report characterized the flaw as main-branch-only based on obsolete v0.2.x tags. On October 7, the maintainer explicitly corrected that statement: date-based releases 2026.5.27 through 2026.9.23 were affected.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsLobsterAI security report: untrusted _meta.json path controls skill uninstallprimary disclosure
Issue description, Affected versions; fisherdaddy comment dated October 7, 2026, Affected versions.
Implications
Agent skill review needs to inspect lifecycle metadata and deletion targets as well as executable instructions.
Controls and mitigations
- The maintainer reports changing deletion to remove only the managed skill directory and eliminating openclawSourceDir from the sync path. This removes the package-controlled deletion target. Verify a distributed build contains that change rather than inferring release delivery solely from issue closure.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The earliest verified fixed binary and downstream package distribution require release verification.
- No production victim count or confirmed actual directory loss was supplied.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Oct 13, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 141