A language-model planner can produce a syntactically valid sequence that is unsafe for a nearby person or physical object. LEASH inserts a task-specific safety reviewer and action gates between the planner and a robot execution interface, using a separate suite of risky robotics tasks. The controlled evaluations report fewer harmful outcomes with the…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
LEASH reduced dangerous robot plans, but some harmful executions remained
A language-model planner can produce a syntactically valid sequence that is unsafe for a nearby person or physical object. LEASH inserts a task-specific safety reviewer and action gates between the planner and a robot execution interface, using a separate suite of risky robotics tasks.
Controlled simulated and selected robot tasks with a defined safety harness; no general independent physical-safety certification.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- simulation
- Exploitation
- not established
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
Designed robotic tasks test planning gates and residual failures, without an independently measured physical incident or general deployment certification. An impact band is not assigned because the available Claims do not establish a comparable verified severity or quantified harm.
Assessed Nov 12, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R239-089-CORE · LEASH robot-task reviews lower physical harm but 5/13 Grok trials still harmful despite safety gate
At a glance
A safety reviewer improves a planner’s screening but does not remove the need for an independent physical interlock.
Read the implicationsOut-of-distribution human proximity, actuator faults, unseen tasks and intervention overhead remain inadequately measured.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
A language-model planner can produce a syntactically valid sequence that is unsafe for a nearby person or physical object. LEASH inserts a task-specific safety reviewer and action gates between the planner and a robot execution interface, using a separate suite of risky robotics tasks.
The controlled evaluations report fewer harmful outcomes with the reviewer but include residual failures, including five harmful cases among thirteen selected Grok trials. The study covers simulations and selected physical-robot tests; it is not certification for arbitrary hardware, people or environments. The reliable question is whether the actuator refuses an unsafe motion under its actual physical constraints.
A safety reviewer improves a planner’s screening but does not remove the need for an independent physical interlock.
A refusal to propose a hazardous command cannot replace actuator constraints, collision control or emergency stop logic. This benchmark tests selected planned tasks and simulator/robot conditions; it neither proves a general factory safety certification nor measures real injuries avoided. The key deployment question is whether the final physical effect remains constrained after an imperfect model decision.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
A robot-oriented language agent proposes task or motion actions.
- 02
LEASH evaluates policy and risk gates before permitted execution in a designed robotic environment.
- 03
Measured unsafe plans and harmful executions are separate metrics, with residual failures after filtering.
Claims & evidence
CLM-R239-089-CORELEASH’s selected robotics safety-gate evaluation still reported harmful outcomes in 5 of 13 Grok-based trials, despite reducing harm relative to ungated tests.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsLEASH robot-task reviews lower physical harm but 5/13 Grok trials still harmful despite safety gateprimary disclosure
Section 5, safety reviewer comparison and residual harmful-outcome tables
Implications
A safety reviewer improves a planner’s screening but does not remove the need for an independent physical interlock.
Controls and mitigations
- Use verified motion limits, emergency-stop mechanisms and sensor-derived state checks outside model output; log attempted versus executed physical actions.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Out-of-distribution human proximity, actuator faults, unseen tasks and intervention overhead remain inadequately measured.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 12, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 241