GPU KV-cache allocations can be valid at the device-memory level while individual inference requests read uninitialized or cross-request cache regions. A request-level sanitizer annotates ownership and initialization state. KVGuard reports finding 29 historic vLLM/SGLang violations and eight new cases under its harness, with measured token-generation…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
KVGuard identifies request-level GPU cache ownership failures missed by allocation checks
GPU KV-cache allocations can be valid at the device-memory level while individual inference requests read uninitialized or cross-request cache regions. KVGuard reports finding 29 historic vLLM/SGLang violations and eight new cases under its harness, with measured token-generation overhead.
Public disclosure: Nov 4, 2026
Controlled empirical evaluation; percentages and effects apply to the reported task populations and conditions, not deployed incidents.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade C
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
research demonstration; demonstrated. The cited primary disclosure supports the specific sequence and boundaries described here: An inference server reuses, transfers or maps KV-cache blocks between overlapping generation requests. The evidence does not independently establish consequences beyond the record's supported outcome; a numerical impact band cannot be justified from the available evidence. Evidence grade C reflects the source attribution and independent verification limits.
Assessed Nov 7, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-DB07-052-OUTCOME · CLM-DB07-052-MECHANISM · CLM-ENR-DB07-029-KVCACHE-SANITIZER-SCOPE · KVGuard: Request-level memory safety for GPU KV caches
At a glance
Test the eight new findings with distinct request canaries and trace whether proposed fixes landed upstream.
Read the implicationsMemory safety bugs not necessarily real cross-tenant prompt leaks; upstream patch submissions not all confirmed merged.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
GPU KV-cache allocations can be valid at the device-memory level while individual inference requests read uninitialized or cross-request cache regions. A request-level sanitizer annotates ownership and initialization state.
KVGuard reports finding 29 historic vLLM/SGLang violations and eight new cases under its harness, with measured token-generation overhead. A detected memory-safety condition does not establish a production cross-tenant prompt leak.
GPU memory allocators can report a valid allocation even when request A reads a KV-cache block that was last owned by request B. KVGuard adds a separate shadow layer tracking request ownership and initialization inside large device allocations, including movement of cache blocks across memory tiers. This is closer to how a multitenant inference server actually reuses cache space than a conventional out-of-bounds allocator check. The paper reports detection of 29 earlier violations plus eight newly found conditions; those numbers count test defects, not confirmed cross-tenant disclosures. Real confidentiality exposure would require demonstrating that request data or outputs crossed a tenant boundary in an affected deployment.
A GPU allocation can remain inside its legal address range while containing tokens owned by the wrong inference request or values not initialized for that request. Ordinary allocation sanitizers therefore cannot establish KV-cache confidentiality or integrity at the request boundary. KVGuard's report of eight new violations calls for canary-based tests that track ownership across batching, reuse and eviction. It does not by itself demonstrate that production customers received one another's prompts, and proposed upstream patches need separate release verification.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
An inference server reuses, transfers or maps KV-cache blocks between overlapping generation requests.
- 02
A request accesses a block whose ownership or initialized state does not match the allocator's coarse view.
- 03
KVGuard checks request-scoped shadow metadata and identifies violations even though the GPU allocation itself remains nominally valid.
Claims & evidence
CLM-DB07-052-OUTCOMEKVGuard reports finding 29 historic vLLM/SGLang violations and eight new cases under its harness, with measured token-generation overhead. A detected memory-safety condition does not establish a production cross-tenant prompt leak.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsKVGuard: Request-level memory safety for GPU KV cachesprimary disclosure
KVGuard design; evaluation of 29 historic and eight new cases
CLM-DB07-052-MECHANISMGPU KV-cache allocations can be valid at the device-memory level while individual inference requests read uninitialized or cross-request cache regions. A request-level sanitizer annotates ownership and initialization state.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsKVGuard: Request-level memory safety for GPU KV cachesprimary disclosure
KVGuard design; evaluation of 29 historic and eight new cases
CLM-ENR-DB07-029-KVCACHE-SANITIZER-SCOPEKVGuard reported 29 previously known and eight additional request-level KV-cache violations in vLLM and SGLang, with measured per-token overhead of about 3.0% and 7.4% in selected Qwen2.5-14B configurations. A violation finding does not itself prove a cross-tenant leak.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsKVGuard: Request-level memory safety for GPU KV cachesprimary disclosure
KVGuard experiments: bug coverage, memory overhead and serving evaluation
Implications
Test the eight new findings with distinct request canaries and trace whether proposed fixes landed upstream.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Memory safety bugs not necessarily real cross-tenant prompt leaks; upstream patch submissions not all confirmed merged.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 7, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 227