Case · DiggingBeagle record

esp-mcp passed tool arguments into a shell under the MCP server’s privileges

Untrusted MCP tool input reached shell construction instead of staying within a safely quoted operation.

Scope

Reachability and permissions depend on which MCP tools were exposed to a given agent or caller.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The advisory names a concrete subprocess_shell argument path through commit 28afddf and identifies attacker-influenced MCP fields. Affected packaged versions and patched versions are explicitly unknown in the reviewed advisory, so no fixed release or field victim can be asserted. Impact is left ungraded because a calibrated 0-to-4 impact basis for actual affected targets is unavailable from these Claims.

Assessed Oct 28, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Claims & evidence

CLM-CP22-021-ACVE-2026-117567 describes OS command injection in esp-mcp code through commit 28afddf.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-CP22-021-BThe scope of consequence is the tool host’s own privileges, not automatic elevation to unrelated machines or a documented mass exploitation event.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-ENRICH-20261028-006The published GitHub advisory does not identify a patched version and marks the affected version range unknown; it associates shell injection with target, port, project_path and project_name arguments.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Controls and mitigations

  • Pass tool inputs as non-shell arguments or fixed RPC parameters, validate command enums and run the MCP server with narrowly scoped host privileges.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • No field victim count or verified lateral movement is established by the published advisory.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 28, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 199