DEPUTYBENCH evaluates agents that have to combine ordinary enterprise tasks with underlying authorization records. In paired controlled situations, models made more restricted-action mistakes when the relevant permission evidence was absent than when it explicitly said no. The authors reported a 10.3 percent restricted-action rate under masked permission…
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DeputyBench found missing authorization evidence riskier than an explicit refusal
DEPUTYBENCH evaluates agents that have to combine ordinary enterprise tasks with underlying authorization records. In paired controlled situations, models made more restricted-action mistakes when the relevant permission evidence was absent than when it explicitly said no. These are executable benchmark tasks, not observed corporate privacy violations, and grader corrections materially changed the measured outcomes.
The authors reported a 10.3 percent restricted-action rate under masked permission evidence versus 3.5 percent with explicit denial on matched tested tasks. Most masked-condition failures were concentrated in four privacy tasks involving cumulative counts or individual consent.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- evaluation
- Exploitation
- not established
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- BY AI
Basis and provenance
evaluation setting with not_established status, based on the identified primary disclosure and its stated test or incident limits. The new Claim distinguishes source observations from hypothetical downstream effects. Impact band is unassigned because the scoped evidence does not justify a comparable quantitative score; no unobserved customer harm or loss is imputed. Remediation state: not_applicable.
Assessed Nov 13, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-ENR243-010-DETAIL · CLM-R242-DEPUTYBENCH-MISSING-PERMISSION-FACTS-LIMITS · CLM-R242-DEPUTYBENCH-MISSING-PERMISSION-FACTS-MECHANISM · DEPUTYBENCH: Evaluating Contextual Safety in Enterprise Agents
At a glance
An assistant must distinguish a missing grant from a positive grant, and a grader must test actual backend permissions as well as the model's explanation. The reported difference becomes smaller and uncertain outside those four concentrated tasks.
Read the implicationsThese are executable benchmark tasks, not observed corporate privacy violations, and grader corrections materially changed the measured outcomes.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
DEPUTYBENCH evaluates agents that have to combine ordinary enterprise tasks with underlying authorization records. In paired controlled situations, models made more restricted-action mistakes when the relevant permission evidence was absent than when it explicitly said no.
The authors reported a 10.3 percent restricted-action rate under masked permission evidence versus 3.5 percent with explicit denial on matched tested tasks. Most masked-condition failures were concentrated in four privacy tasks involving cumulative counts or individual consent. An assistant must distinguish a missing grant from a positive grant, and a grader must test actual backend permissions as well as the model's explanation. The reported difference becomes smaller and uncertain outside those four concentrated tasks.
These are executable benchmark tasks, not observed corporate privacy violations, and grader corrections materially changed the measured outcomes. Evaluate permission-unknown, explicitly denied and positively approved states as separate cases with checked side-effect receipts.
Evidence reconciliation and effect boundary. Each suspicious request has a paired legitimate version whose business objective is similar but whose permission facts differ. An agent can receive credit for refusing the prohibited case and still fail by refusing the authorized twin, which is why pooled safety and paired success are separate measurements. The benchmark team also revised its audits after discovering permission-sensitive grading gaps. Its failure percentages are evaluator observations, not a count of enterprise customers harmed.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
The authors reported a 10.3 percent restricted-action rate under masked permission evidence versus 3.5 percent with explicit denial on matched tested tasks. Most masked-condition failures were concentrated in four privacy tasks involving cumulative counts or individual consent.
- 02
An assistant must distinguish a missing grant from a positive grant, and a grader must test actual backend permissions as well as the model's explanation. The reported difference becomes smaller and uncertain outside those four concentrated tasks.
Claims & evidence
CLM-ENR243-010-DETAILDeputyBench contains 79 base items and 375 executable permission-context instances; the revised 12-model audit reported 88.0% pooled safety, 90.4% completion and 79.1% paired success, with scorer corrections affecting interpretation.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsDEPUTYBENCH: Evaluating Contextual Safety in Enterprise Agentsprimary disclosure
DeputyBench, Abstract, Introduction and scorer-v2.1 results
CLM-R242-DEPUTYBENCH-MISSING-PERMISSION-FACTS-LIMITSThese are executable benchmark tasks, not observed corporate privacy violations, and grader corrections materially changed the measured outcomes.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsDEPUTYBENCH: Evaluating Contextual Safety in Enterprise Agentsprimary disclosure
Abstract, 79 base items and masked-versus-denied permission experiment with confidence interval
CLM-R242-DEPUTYBENCH-MISSING-PERMISSION-FACTS-MECHANISMDEPUTYBENCH evaluates agents that have to combine ordinary enterprise tasks with underlying authorization records. In paired controlled situations, models made more restricted-action mistakes when the relevant permission evidence was absent than when it explicitly said no.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsDEPUTYBENCH: Evaluating Contextual Safety in Enterprise Agentsprimary disclosure
Abstract, 79 base items and masked-versus-denied permission experiment with confidence interval
Implications
An assistant must distinguish a missing grant from a positive grant, and a grader must test actual backend permissions as well as the model's explanation. The reported difference becomes smaller and uncertain outside those four concentrated tasks.
Controls and mitigations
- Evaluate permission-unknown, explicitly denied and positively approved states as separate cases with checked side-effect receipts.
Unknowns and contradictions
- These are executable benchmark tasks, not observed corporate privacy violations, and grader corrections materially changed the measured outcomes.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 13, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 244