Case · DiggingBeagle record

Carryover isolates the planting and later activation of persistent agent injection

Scope

Controlled evaluation of persistent agent state and selected harness defenses.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
evaluation
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
not applicable
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

CLM-CARRYOVER reports: Carryover evaluates persistent injection across 101 tasks and 12 scenarios, separating the turn that plants malicious state from later turns that trigger it. Source SRC-2026-RADAR-CARRYOVER is located at 'Abstract, benchmark design and persistence analysis'. The distinctive mechanism begins: CarryoverBench separates an attacker's initial insertion into persistent memory or a scheduled heartbeat task from the later activation of that content. Classification: setting=evaluation, exploit_status=demonstrated, evidence_grade=B on the bounded original investigator/vendor or paper evidence, without independent dynamic replication. remediation_status=not_applicable; scoped control or limit: Treat persisted instructions as untrusted, revalidate the author and intended permissions on each reload, and gate autonomous scheduled effects independently from the text that requested them. A later agent turn must not inherit irrevocable authority merely because a file survived. The null impact band avoids an ungrounded cross-Case severity rating; observed damage, targeted population and controlled test outcomes cannot be exchanged as the same quantity. Where a patch is described, its availability is separate from independently tested effectiveness.

Assessed Oct 23, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Timeline

  1. Oct 20, 2026
    disclosure

    Public disclosure

Claims & evidence

CLM-CARRYOVERCarryover evaluates persistent injection across 101 tasks and 12 scenarios, separating the turn that plants malicious state from later turns that trigger it.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Controls and mitigations

  • Treat persisted instructions as untrusted, revalidate the author and intended permissions on each reload, and gate autonomous scheduled effects independently from the text that requested them. A later agent turn must not inherit irrevocable authority merely because a file survived.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • No independent rerun, production incidence estimate or universal persistence guarantee.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 23, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 183