A cyber-defense benchmark can rank agents based on its action accounting rather than on the security effects they actually accomplished. The CAGE 4 audit reproduces reference defender results, then traces a simulator state in which attempted Restore actions are charged even while the defender is busy and no action runs. The hidden busy-state check and…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
CAGE 4 benchmark scoring can penalize agent actions the simulator never executed
A cyber-defense benchmark can rank agents based on its action accounting rather than on the security effects they actually accomplished. The CAGE 4 audit reproduces reference defender results, then traces a simulator state in which attempted Restore actions are charged even while the defender is busy and no action runs.
Reproduced evaluation and simulator implementation under pinned benchmark configurations, not a live defender deployment.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- evaluation
- Exploitation
- not established
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
A detailed reproducibility audit of CAGE 4 scoring and busy-state behavior, not an in-the-wild attack against any SOC. An impact band is not assigned because the available Claims do not establish a comparable verified severity or quantified harm.
Assessed Nov 12, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R239-006-CORE · CAGE 4 audit: discarded Restore actions charged, hidden busy state changes rankings and defender sampling causes 88.9% variance
At a glance
Leaderboard scores cannot establish cyber resilience when a simulator conflates attempted and executed actions.
Read the implicationsImpact on independently deployed policies, real network protection and every published CAGE ranking is not established.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
A cyber-defense benchmark can rank agents based on its action accounting rather than on the security effects they actually accomplished. The CAGE 4 audit reproduces reference defender results, then traces a simulator state in which attempted Restore actions are charged even while the defender is busy and no action runs.
The hidden busy-state check and stochastic policy sampling alter score comparisons. The paper attributes 88.9% of KEEP outcome variance under the stock adversary to policy sampling within episodes; removing busy handling produces large score degradation even with identical executed actions. Corrected wrappers and training seeds are necessary to decide whether apparent defender advances are operational or evaluation artifacts. These are simulator findings, not production intrusion-response failures.
Leaderboard scores cannot establish cyber resilience when a simulator conflates attempted and executed actions.
An invalid or never-executed action should not automatically be equated with an executed remediation failure. This audit concerns the measurement apparatus, not a compromised production SOC; reward differences can arise from scheduling and randomness even when the defender's realized effects are unchanged. Reproductions must report exact simulator, wrapper and random seeds before comparing model rankings.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
The CAGE 4 simulator receives an attempted defender action while another action remains in progress.
- 02
The environment discards some attempted Restore actions but the scoring path still charges them.
- 03
Hidden busy-state access and unseeded policy sampling change observed reward without corresponding differences in executed security actions.
Claims & evidence
CLM-R239-006-COREThe CAGE 4 audit reports 88.9% of KEEP score variance under the stock attacker came from within-episode policy-action sampling, while ignored Restore attempts could still incur penalties.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsCAGE 4 audit: discarded Restore actions charged, hidden busy state changes rankings and defender sampling causes 88.9% varianceprimary disclosure
Section 4 Silent Drop; Section 5 variance decomposition and Figure 2
Implications
Leaderboard scores cannot establish cyber resilience when a simulator conflates attempted and executed actions.
Controls and mitigations
- Score only executed effects or explicitly separate attempted and committed operations; pin simulator, reference policy, random seeds and adversary.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Impact on independently deployed policies, real network protection and every published CAGE ranking is not established.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 12, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 241