BypassGym measures a capability often missed by coding-agent leaderboards: making an executable loader run under an endpoint protection product instead of merely writing plausible attack code. Five agents built loaders against six endpoint suites and three predetermined payload families in isolated Windows virtual machines, using detection feedback to…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
BypassGym agents evaded endpoint defenses in 71 of 90 controlled tests
BypassGym measures a capability often missed by coding-agent leaderboards: making an executable loader run under an endpoint protection product instead of merely writing plausible attack code. Five agents built loaders against six endpoint suites and three predetermined payload families in isolated Windows virtual machines, using detection feedback to revise candidates.
Authorized laboratory tests on selected Windows 11 virtual machines and configured EDR products; no field victim or independent criminal deployment.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
- Remediation
- not applicable
- AI role
- WITH AI
Basis and provenance
The original benchmark tests actual endpoint execution in isolated VMs with curated payloads and model resources. No victim exposure rate or real deployment is measured. An impact band is not assigned because the available Claims do not establish a comparable verified severity or quantified harm.
Assessed Nov 12, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-R239-005-CORE · BypassGym coding agents generated EDR-evasive loaders in 71 of 90 isolated tests
At a glance
AI-agent offensive capability needs to be scored by completed host effects under realistic defenses, not just code generation.
Read the implicationsEnterprise policy variation, current product builds, repeat-run variance and how much success came from furnished templates remain unmeasured.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
BypassGym measures a capability often missed by coding-agent leaderboards: making an executable loader run under an endpoint protection product instead of merely writing plausible attack code. Five agents built loaders against six endpoint suites and three predetermined payload families in isolated Windows virtual machines, using detection feedback to revise candidates.
The paper reports 71 successful runs out of 90, compared with 3 of 18 unmodified controls. Success included payload execution and the prescribed connection and file-transfer behaviors. It was not a malware campaign: agents received curated offensive templates and the study ran on selected product versions and policies. The contrast across products, including much lower Bitdefender results than Defender, is more informative than a single headline average.
AI-agent offensive capability needs to be scored by completed host effects under realistic defenses, not just code generation.
The 71 successful cells include host execution and prescribed post-execution effects, which is materially stronger than grading only generated source code. It is not a deployment prevalence estimate: the toolchain, available signed binaries and EDR configuration were intentionally controlled. A clean comparison would hold supplied offensive templates and retry budgets constant before claiming an intrinsic model advantage.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
An agent receives a predefined payload and selected development resources inside a controlled endpoint lab.
- 02
It compiles or revises a loader in response to endpoint detection and execution feedback.
- 03
The benchmark credits a run only after the defined payload effects are observed in a Windows virtual machine.
Claims & evidence
CLM-R239-005-COREIn the BypassGym isolated 90-cell evaluation, agent-created loaders completed the defined evasion objective in 71 runs; unmodified payload controls succeeded in 3 of 18.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsBypassGym coding agents generated EDR-evasive loaders in 71 of 90 isolated testsprimary disclosure
Section 5, experimental effectiveness tables and success definition
Implications
AI-agent offensive capability needs to be scored by completed host effects under realistic defenses, not just code generation.
Controls and mitigations
- Validate actual endpoint execution and post-execution effects; update EDR signatures and hardening, and reproduce against pinned builds before treating the reported rates as exposure.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Enterprise policy variation, current product builds, repeat-run variance and how much success came from furnished templates remain unmeasured.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 12, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 241