Case · DiggingBeagle record

AWS Serverless MCP project names escaped the deployment-status directory

Versions below 0.2.1 accepted project names that could address JSON files outside the intended directory. Writes additionally required the server's write-enabled mode; 0.2.1 is the documented fix.

Public disclosure: Nov 2, 2026

Scope

Vulnerability reported in a controlled research or disclosure setting. Exact prerequisites, versions and absence of documented exploitation must be preserved.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Setting
research demonstration
Exploitation
demonstrated
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
patch available
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The cited first-party advisory or research establishes the stated mechanism only within its documented conditions. No unrelated production compromise, extended victim scope, financial harm or universal mitigation is inferred.

Assessed Nov 9, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    A caller supplies a crafted project name to a vulnerable deployment-status tool.

  2. 02

    Path construction accepts traversal or an absolute path outside the intended status directory, subject to process filesystem permissions.

  3. 03

    Readable JSON content can enter tool output; deployment-metadata writes additionally require --enable-write.

Claims & evidence

CLM-AWS-SERVERLESS-MCP-PATHThe maintainer advisory documents that crafted project names can address JSON files outside the intended local deployment-status directory in AWS Serverless MCP Server versions below 0.2.1. Write operations additionally require --enable-write and write deployment metadata; this does not establish arbitrary attacker-chosen file contents. Version 0.2.1 is listed as patched.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Tool arguments become filesystem authority unless constrained at the actual MCP tool host.

Controls and mitigations

  • Upgrade AWS Serverless MCP Server to at least 0.2.1 and check resolved paths remain within a dedicated local status directory.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • No established production stolen file, arbitrary OS code execution or exposure of unrelated service data beyond the paths admitted by process privileges.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 9, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 233