Case · DiggingBeagle record

Astron Agent legacy workflow executor could cross tenant boundaries

iFlytek patched a legacy unsandboxed Astron Agent code executor that exposed workflow-container execution and, in affected multi-tenant deployments, access to other tenants’ data.

Scope

Astron Agent versions through v1.1.1 using the legacy unsandboxed local executor; patched v1.1.2 requires coordinated service and configuration changes.

Assessment profile

Assessment method
Exploitation
not established
Evidence
Grade B
Remediation
patch available
AI role
AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance

The September 7 vendor security release documents code-node isolation failure and versioned remediation. Its presence does not establish a deployed exploit, victim count, or independent reproduction of the researcher’s most severe claimed outcomes.

Assessed Oct 11, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Workflow code submission

    Authenticated user with workflow creation rights supplies code to a legacy local executor.

    Boundary: Tenant workflow permissions to shared workflow service container

  2. 02

    Shared runtime access

    Executed code inherits more service and database reach than the tenant UI intended.

    Boundary: Workflow container process to other tenants’ data

Timeline

  1. Sep 7, 2026
    patch

    Astron Agent v1.1.2 security release

    Vendor documented the legacy unsandboxed workflow executor and the isolated default replacement.

Claims & evidence

CLM-AA-SCOPEThe release describes versions through v1.1.1 using local execution as affected and notes that single-tenant installations retain a code-execution risk.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-AA-RELEASE-FIXiFlytek lists v1.1.2 as the security release, with an isolated executor by default, internal service hardening and upgrade guidance covering both service images and configuration.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-AA-EXECUTOR-IMPACTiFlytek says the legacy unsandboxed local workflow executor could let authenticated workflow creators execute code in its workflow container and access or modify other tenants’ data in affected deployments.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

The immediate boundary is between tenant-authored workflow code and the shared workflow service container. Moving code nodes into the isolated executor and applying internal service authorization blocks the vendor-described route, but updating only a front-end or leaving the legacy local executor explicitly enabled does not establish isolation.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • Whether custom overrides can recreate equivalent unsafe execution after upgrading.
  • Independent confirmation of the researcher’s reported root-context test and cross-tenant database operations.
  • Production exploitation and number of vulnerable installations.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Oct 11, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 123