Case · DiggingBeagle record

ARTEX agents reproduced face-movement prompts, but recorded KYC checks rejected every synthetic attempt

A separate ARTEX-associated workstream targeted verification at two cryptocurrency exchanges using generated video and forged identification images. Its agent records describe reverse-engineering a liveness vendor's face-motion challenge and testing real-time animation.

Public disclosure: Nov 13, 2026

Scope

Offensive agents and facial animation tooling can reach or emulate exchange onboarding and identity verification steps.

UnratedAI role: BY AI / WITH AIAssessment method

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Starting condition

    Offensive agents and facial animation tooling can reach or emulate exchange onboarding and identity verification steps.

    Boundary: precondition and attacker capability

  2. 02

    Trust boundary crossed or evaluated

    The best logged synthetic face tracked the expected location within seven pixels; an optimized consumer-GPU pipeline reached approximately 11.5 frames per second. The attackers also manipulated JPEG camera metadata and compression evidence, seeking consistency with photographs rather than screen captures.

    Boundary: mechanism

  3. 03

    Observed consequence

    Following a visible client-side movement challenge is distinct from passing the server-side identity decision and authorizing a withdrawal.

    Boundary: observed effect and limitations

Claims & evidence

CLM-NOV15-ARTEXKYC-MECHA separate ARTEX-associated workstream targeted verification at two cryptocurrency exchanges using generated video and forged identification images. Its agent records describe reverse-engineering a liveness vendor's face-motion challenge and testing real-time animation. The best logged synthetic face tracked the expected location within seven pixels; an optimized consumer-GPU pipeline reached approximately 11.5 frames per second. The attackers also manipulated JPEG camera metadata and compression evidence, seeking consistency with photographs rather than screen captures.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-NOV15-ARTEXKYC-SCOPEThe server-side liveness verdict was REJECTED for every attempt shown in the recovered sessions. This is evidence of a coordinated attacker effort and a measured failure of those attempts, not evidence that an exchange authorized a forged identity or released funds. The report draws on an attacker-side decoy interaction. Exchange audit logs, real accounts and any successful cashout were not independently confirmed; the KYC study must not be merged into the separate account-key harvesting operation.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Following a visible client-side movement challenge is distinct from passing the server-side identity decision and authorizing a withdrawal.

Controls and mitigations

  • Bind KYC verdicts and subsequent withdrawal permissions to server-side challenge receipts, replay detection and session identity.
  • Treat visual motion scores, synthetic EXIF and generator throughput as attacker capability measurements, not as accepted-user or financial-loss counts.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The report draws on an attacker-side decoy interaction. Exchange audit logs, real accounts and any successful cashout were not independently confirmed; the KYC study must not be merged into the separate account-key harvesting operation.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250