Anthropic says DeepSeek silently routed selected customer traffic through Claude
Anthropic reports that a DeepSeek distillation pipeline forwarded selected user requests to Claude without users' knowledge, exposing sensitive business and government data across an unexpected provider boundary.
Anthropic's September 2026 report. This is a provider-side allegation and technical attribution by Anthropic; independent verification from DeepSeek is not included in the current source set.
First seen
Sep 10, 2026
Case kind
incident
AI role
WITH AI
Claims
3
Reconstruction
The risk is easiest to understand from the customer's point of view. A user believed a request was going to a DeepSeek model. Anthropic says DeepSeek inspected request strings, selected some sessions and relayed them to Claude Opus through third-party or Anthropic coding harnesses.
Anthropic reports examples where those relayed requests contained sensitive corporate program details, live credentials for a Russian government database and engineering work for a municipal Chinese police-surveillance system. The users did not have an obvious reason to expect Anthropic to receive that material.
The same infrastructure also served a model-distillation goal. Anthropic says DeepSeek used cross-session replay to recover reasoning traces and attributes more than 12.1 million exchanges to the campaign over 14 days in July. The security problem is therefore both model theft and undisclosed data routing.
Mechanism & boundary
01
Identify selected inbound sessions
The reported system tags users of particular third-party or coding harnesses.
Boundary: customer request / routing logic
02
Relay the request to Claude
Selected traffic is forwarded to Claude Opus without the customer's expected provider boundary.
Boundary: DeepSeek / Anthropic
03
Capture outputs and reasoning traces
The reported pipeline uses responses as distillation material.
Boundary: service response / training pipeline
04
Expose sensitive customer content
Unexpected routing carries whatever secrets are present in the original request.
Boundary: customer data / unexpected provider
Timeline
Sep 10, 2026
Anthropic publishes GTG-16001 case study
report
The report describes hidden routing, distillation and sensitive-data examples.
Claims & evidence
reported findingsupported
Anthropic reports that DeepSeek silently relayed selected user requests to Claude Opus while users believed they were using DeepSeek.
Anthropic reports more than 12.1 million exchanges over 14 days in July 2026.
reported findingsupported
Anthropic says relayed traffic included sensitive company information, live Russian government database credentials and PRC police-surveillance development requests.
Model routing is part of the data boundary. Enterprises need evidence about which provider actually receives prompts, logs and credentials, especially when routing services or coding harnesses sit between the user and the advertised model.
Controls & mitigations
Require contractual and technical disclosure of downstream model providers and routing paths.
Do not place live credentials or sensitive production data into model-routing services without explicit data-boundary review.
Monitor for routing or proxy behavior that changes the actual model provider behind an advertised service.
What remains unknown
The current source set contains Anthropic's account but no DeepSeek response.
The public report does not enumerate every affected customer or request.
DiggingBeagle is a non profit research project documenting AI security incidents, agent failures, vulnerabilities and AI-assisted operations. A case keeps its claims beside the sources that support, contest or limit them. Later updates stay visible, so a reader can see when the account changed.
We publish case reconstructions, dated reporting and analysis across records. Each has a different evidentiary role. About the project and our methodology explain how the work is reviewed.