AiR-ViBeR moves the carrier from airborne sound to the surface supporting the computer. Malware changes fan speed in controlled patterns. The spinning fan creates mechanical vibration, and those vibrations propagate through a desk or nearby furniture even when the resulting sound is not a useful microphone channel. A smartphone placed on the same or an…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
AiR-ViBeR moved data through desk vibrations into a smartphone accelerometer
AiR-ViBeR research modulated computer-fan speed to create low-frequency surface vibrations that could be sensed by a smartphone accelerometer on the same or an adjacent table.
Scope
Laboratory vibrational covert channel requiring compromised fan control and a suitably placed smartphone receiver.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade B
Basis and provenance
The only recorded mechanism claim describes fan vibration transmission to an accelerometer under controlled placement; deployment prevalence is unestablished. Assessment is a desk review of the retained canonical Claims and cited Source metadata at their recorded cutoff, not a new external verification. Impact remains ungraded.
Assessed Sep 24, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-AIRVIBER-MECHANISM · AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Surface ViBrAtIoNs
At a glance
AiR-ViBeR demonstrates that physical coupling through furniture can cross a containment boundary that is neither network nor acoustic in the usual sense. The result is relevant only when a receiver shares enough mechanical coupling with the protected machine, but it broadens the inventory of nearby sensors that a high-assurance environment may need to…
Read the implicationsPerformance varies substantially with furniture, mounting, fan design, distance and environmental vibration. The result does not imply useful transmission through arbitrary floors, walls or structurally isolated surfaces. No cited evidence shows an AI system autonomously discovering or operating the channel.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
AiR-ViBeR moves the carrier from airborne sound to the surface supporting the computer. Malware changes fan speed in controlled patterns. The spinning fan creates mechanical vibration, and those vibrations propagate through a desk or nearby furniture even when the resulting sound is not a useful microphone channel.
A smartphone placed on the same or an adjacent table uses its accelerometer to measure the low-frequency movement and decode the pattern. The underlying cause is an actuator-sensor pairing: software influences fan rotation, fan imbalance and mounting transfer energy into the surface, and commodity accelerometers are sensitive enough to observe some of that movement.
The channel requires prior compromise, controllable fans and physical coupling between the computer and receiver. It is consequently sensitive to furniture construction, fan hardware, placement and background vibration.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Run code that can influence fan behavior
The transmitter must already execute on the isolated system and control or provoke repeatable fan-speed changes.
Boundary: protected host / cooling actuator
- 02
Encode bits as fan-speed changes
Secret data is mapped to rotation-speed states or timing patterns.
Boundary: secret data / fan-control pattern
- 03
Transfer energy into the supporting surface
Rotating hardware produces low-frequency mechanical vibration that propagates through a desk or adjacent structure.
Boundary: computer chassis / shared surface
- 04
Sense movement with a smartphone accelerometer
A suitably placed phone measures the vibration without requiring a microphone channel.
Boundary: shared surface / receiver sensor
- 05
Decode the vibration pattern
Receiver software converts the accelerometer signal back into the transmitted bitstream.
Boundary: accelerometer readings / recovered data
Claims & evidence
CLM-AIRVIBER-MECHANISMAiR-ViBeR demonstrated data exfiltration by modulating fan-generated surface vibrations and sensing them with smartphone accelerometers.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsAiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Surface ViBrAtIoNsrole not specified
Abstract, mechanism and evaluation summary
Implications
AiR-ViBeR demonstrates that physical coupling through furniture can cross a containment boundary that is neither network nor acoustic in the usual sense. The result is relevant only when a receiver shares enough mechanical coupling with the protected machine, but it broadens the inventory of nearby sensors that a high-assurance environment may need to control.
Controls and mitigations
- Mechanically isolate protected equipment from surfaces accessible to untrusted devices.
- Keep smartphones and other sensitive accelerometer-equipped devices outside the immediate physical zone.
- Constrain software fan-control interfaces and investigate patterned fan behavior where it is distinguishable from normal thermal management.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Performance varies substantially with furniture, mounting, fan design, distance and environmental vibration.
- The result does not imply useful transmission through arbitrary floors, walls or structurally isolated surfaces.
- No cited evidence shows an AI system autonomously discovering or operating the channel.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Sep 19, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 15
- Sep 19, 2026 · Published version · material revision · revision 20Public fields changed: attack_path, implications, mitigations, narrative, unknowns
- Sep 25, 2026 · Published version · material revision · revision 36Public fields changed: assessment_profile