The AgentScope Bash-tool safety classifier treated tee as a safe command even though it writes files and short-circuited before destination-path danger checks. CVE-2026-123023 documents policy bypass for write effects without required human approval, with 2.0.9 identified as fixed. The effects remain limited by the tool process filesystem permissions. The…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
AgentScope treated the file-writing tee command as safe without human approval
The AgentScope Bash-tool safety classifier treated tee as a safe command even though it writes files and short-circuited before destination-path danger checks. CVE-2026-123023 documents policy bypass for write effects without required human approval, with 2.0.9 identified as fixed.
Public disclosure: Nov 5, 2026
Reported security vulnerability; exploitation prerequisites and tested version scope matter. No real-world exploitation is established unless separately reported.
Assessment profile
Assessment method- Setting
- research demonstration
- Exploitation
- demonstrated
- Evidence
- Grade C
- Remediation
- patch available
- AI role
- AGAINST AI
Basis and provenance
research demonstration; demonstrated. The cited primary disclosure supports the specific sequence and boundaries described here: Agent or operator invokes Bash-tool execution with tee in the command. The evidence does not independently establish consequences beyond the record's supported outcome; a numerical impact band cannot be justified from the available evidence. Evidence grade C reflects the source attribution and independent verification limits.
Assessed Nov 7, 2026 using diggingbeagle.assessment/1.
Evidence basis: CLM-DB07-018-OUTCOME · CLM-DB07-018-MECHANISM · Advisory: AgentScope Bash safety classifier treats tee as read-only and approves file writes
At a glance
Classify side effects rather than executable names and enforce protected-path checks even after an apparently safe verb.
Read the implicationsTool must be called; effect limited by process filesystem privileges; no real exploit known.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
The AgentScope Bash-tool safety classifier treated tee as a safe command even though it writes files and short-circuited before destination-path danger checks.
CVE-2026-123023 documents policy bypass for write effects without required human approval, with 2.0.9 identified as fixed. The effects remain limited by the tool process filesystem permissions.
The decisive mistake is a control-flow shortcut inside the Bash-tool permission classifier. Once tee is recognized as safe by executable name, the classifier can skip the checks that would normally examine write effects and protected paths. A safe-looking input pipeline can therefore write to files accessible to the agent process. The advisory names version 2.0.9 as the corrective release; it does not prove that other write-capable shell forms are comprehensively blocked. The tested problem is approval bypass within the tool's own filesystem authority, not privilege escalation beyond the operating-system account.
This finding starts after a tool call has already been admitted. The caller may be a legitimate agent, yet classifying a shell verb as harmless authorizes a write that the user never approved. Fixing the shared user-identity weakness or the MCP server-registration path does not repair this per-action review. The version 2.0.9 fix addresses the reported tee behavior, while the advisory does not establish whether every shell alias or pipeline with a write effect is classified correctly.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Agent or operator invokes Bash-tool execution with tee in the command.
- 02
SAFE_COMMANDS classification returns without checking a write destination or requesting the intended approval.
- 03
The shell writes to a path permitted by the underlying service account even when policy intended that write to be reviewed.
Claims & evidence
CLM-DB07-018-OUTCOMECVE-2026-123023 documents policy bypass for write effects without required human approval, with 2.0.9 identified as fixed. The effects remain limited by the tool process filesystem permissions.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsAdvisory: AgentScope Bash safety classifier treats tee as read-only and approves file writesprimary disclosure
GHSA-fh34-mp6h-q3xc; SAFE_COMMANDS and tee proof
CLM-DB07-018-MECHANISMThe AgentScope Bash-tool safety classifier treated tee as a safe command even though it writes files and short-circuited before destination-path danger checks.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsAdvisory: AgentScope Bash safety classifier treats tee as read-only and approves file writesprimary disclosure
GHSA-fh34-mp6h-q3xc; SAFE_COMMANDS and tee proof
Implications
Classify side effects rather than executable names and enforce protected-path checks even after an apparently safe verb.
Unknowns and contradictions
- Tool must be called; effect limited by process filesystem privileges; no real exploit known.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 7, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 227