Agentic Process Evidence proposes signed session-to-artifact provenance with external gates

Agentic Process Evidence addresses a gap left by conventional repository history. A commit identifies a code change, but not necessarily the model, harness, tools, external data or human approvals that produced it. The JFrog proposal records those elements and binds them through signed, machine-readable attestations aligned with in-toto style workflows. A delivery or merge gate can then check for an appropriate process record before accepting a changed artifact. The enforcement location matters: an agent writing its own testimony is not an independent approval mechanism.

Cryptographic signatures can establish who signed a statement and whether its bytes changed, but they cannot guarantee that every tool call was logged or that a model’s explanation is truthful. The proposed record also creates a sensitive telemetry surface that may contain prompts and secret-bearing tool traces. The paper presents an architecture and example policy-gate use cases, not evidence that industry systems have adopted a universally complete standard or that the design has eliminated prompt injection.