Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
Lukas Weichselbaum on PageBreak and three illustrative bug chains
First-person statement from a PageBreak team member. Describes a separately obtained signature that allowed a javascript: URI in an admin-console workflow, cache poisoning on apis.google.com and universal XSS in Tag Assistant. Repeats the 500-plus XSS and hardened-framework subgroup figures. This is a team account, not independent reproduction.
- Publisher
- Lukas Weichselbaum
- Source role
- primary disclosure
Evidence record
First-person statement from a PageBreak team member. Describes a separately obtained signature that allowed a javascript: URI in an admin-console workflow, cache poisoning on apis.google.com and universal XSS in Tag Assistant. Repeats the 500-plus XSS and hardened-framework subgroup figures. This is a team account, not independent reproduction.
Claim-level citations (2)
- supportsGoogle PageBreak tests AI-found web vulnerabilities with executable proof: PageBreak forwards a vulnerability candidate as a verified report only after specialized, security-engineer-written, non-AI validators execute a real exploit check against a running environment; unverified hypotheses are retained for future investigation rather than reported as proven bugs.
Lukas Weichselbaum post, paragraph beginning "In PageBreak, the model can suggest"
- supportsGoogle PageBreak tests AI-found web vulnerabilities with executable proof: PageBreak team member Lukas Weichselbaum described an admin.google.com XSS chain that combined a signature-protected endpoint with a separate endpoint willing to sign a javascript: URL, plus cache poisoning on apis.google.com and universal XSS in the Tag Assistant extension.
Lukas Weichselbaum post, paragraph beginning "The vulnerable endpoint only accepted requests"