Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
Chainstack November 2026 security incident reconstruction
Primary or origin disclosure used to qualify the underlying mechanism, stated prerequisites and limits. Internet-exposed dev Grafana retained default admin/no SSO; unrestricted datasource proxy reaches internal MCP server unauthenticated as cluster-admin. Attacker changed ConfigMaps to web JavaScript loader, temporarily edited workflow automation DB/webhook to print secrets, accessed K8s production secrets via stolen machine/deploy IDs, exfiltrated selected PostgreSQL data, created K8s service identities/static-Pod relay/cron/chisel, touched secrets manager. VPN peer key identity flapping led to discovery.
- Source role
- primary disclosure
Evidence record
Primary or origin disclosure used to qualify the underlying mechanism, stated prerequisites and limits. Internet-exposed dev Grafana retained default admin/no SSO; unrestricted datasource proxy reaches internal MCP server unauthenticated as cluster-admin. Attacker changed ConfigMaps to web JavaScript loader, temporarily edited workflow automation DB/webhook to print secrets, accessed K8s production secrets via stolen machine/deploy IDs, exfiltrated selected PostgreSQL data, created K8s service identities/static-Pod relay/cron/chisel, touched secrets manager. VPN peer key identity flapping led to discovery.
Claim-level citations (4)
- supportsChainstack compromise crossed an unauthenticated Kubernetes MCP control plane: Chainstack describes a developer Grafana deployment with default credentials and a datasource proxy that reached an internal Kubernetes MCP service with cluster-admin authority; that path preceded access to production secrets and data.
Chainstack November incident report, initial entry and Grafana datasource proxy to MCP/Kubernetes account chronology
- supportsChainstack compromise crossed an unauthenticated Kubernetes MCP control plane: Chainstack reports database-level modification and restoration of an automation workflow during an intrusion that also traversed a default-credential Grafana and a cluster-admin Kubernetes MCP server.
Chainstack incident report, October 26-31 chronology, Grafana datasource proxy, DB-edited workflow and production secret-manager access
- supportsChainstack compromise crossed an unauthenticated Kubernetes MCP control plane: The public incident account does not prove every action was model-chosen, that every accessible secret was exfiltrated or that the ARTEX tool lineage identifies the same operator as the Barracuda intrusion.
Incident report, Grafana entry, internal MCP access, credential use and Kubernetes changes
- supportsChainstack compromise crossed an unauthenticated Kubernetes MCP control plane: Chainstack described an intrusion that started from an exposed development Grafana instance with default credentials. Its data-source proxy could reach an internal Kubernetes MCP server without independent authentication, and commands there ran with cluster-administrator authority.
Incident report, Grafana entry, internal MCP access, credential use and Kubernetes changes