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asset-group/ghostcommit public proof of concept
Public GhostCommit PoC repository with the evolved attack fixture, decoder, threat-model document, safe reproduction procedure, retained desktop recording and verified result matrices. Its current Codex results cover 60 CLI trials across GPT-5.6 Luna/Sol/Terra plus six separate App observations, with explicit EXFIL, REFUSED and RETRACT definitions and a warning not to generalize fixture-specific counts.
Each support, contradiction or context label applies to a cited Claim, not to a whole Case.
Source record
Public GhostCommit PoC repository with the evolved attack fixture, decoder, threat-model document, safe reproduction procedure, retained desktop recording and verified result matrices. Its current Codex results cover 60 CLI trials across GPT-5.6 Luna/Sol/Terra plus six separate App observations, with explicit EXFIL, REFUSED and RETRACT definitions and a warning not to generalize fixture-specific counts.
Claim-level citations (4)
- supportsGhostCommit hid agent instructions in a repository image and exfiltrated synthetic secrets through generated code: In the current public PoC's 60 Codex CLI trials, scored as EXFIL only for byte-for-byte recovery of the full five-canary .env, GPT-5.6 Luna produced 20/20 EXFIL; GPT-5.6 Sol produced 8 EXFIL and 12 REFUSED; GPT-5.6 Terra produced 10 EXFIL, 8 REFUSED and 2 RETRACT. Six separate Codex App observations used on-request approvals, workspace-write access and disabled network access; Luna exfiltrated in both of its observations while Sol and Terra refused in theirs.
results/CODEX.md, sections 'Scoring rule', 'Codex CLI' and 'Codex App'
- supportsGhostCommit hid agent instructions in a repository image and exfiltrated synthetic secrets through generated code: The GhostCommit attack splits the malicious instruction across an innocuous repository convention and a PNG: AGENTS.md points the coding agent to the image, while the image contains the instructions to read .env, encode its bytes and emit them into generated source.
README sections 'How the attack works' and 'Scope and limitations'
- supportsGhostCommit hid agent instructions in a repository image and exfiltrated synthetic secrets through generated code: The evolved GhostCommit fixture does not rely on the PNG alone: it adds a roughly fifty-line fake provenance validator and a fabricated incident postmortem so the repository convention appears to have an operational purpose and can pass a coherence-oriented review.
docs/ATTACK.md, 'Delivery' section listing prov_check.py, workflow and fabricated postmortem
- supportsGhostCommit hid agent instructions in a repository image and exfiltrated synthetic secrets through generated code: GhostCommit is a proof of concept using synthetic credentials in repositories controlled by the researchers; the cited material does not establish production exploitation or theft of real secrets.
README sections 'Scope and limitations' and 'Ethics and license'
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DiggingBeagle. “asset-group/ghostcommit public proof of concept.” https://diggingbeagle.com/sources/asset-group-ghostcommit-public-proof-of-concept/
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