Evidence · DiggingBeagle record
Advisory: AgentScope trusts caller-controlled X-User-ID across >45 endpoints, exposing other users agent data
AgentScope Service treated a nonempty X-User-ID request header as the user principal across a broad set of agent-management APIs. CVE-2026-123024 describes cross-user agent settings, history, credentials and scheduled-job access when clients can reach the default service without an authenticating reverse proxy. The report does not establish affected deployed tenant counts. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
- Source role
- primary disclosure
Evidence record
AgentScope Service treated a nonempty X-User-ID request header as the user principal across a broad set of agent-management APIs. CVE-2026-123024 describes cross-user agent settings, history, credentials and scheduled-job access when clients can reach the default service without an authenticating reverse proxy. The report does not establish affected deployed tenant counts. Research/disclosure claims are specific to the documented settings; do not infer unreported victims or additional compromise.
Claim-level citations (2)
- supportsAgentScope accepted spoofed user identity headers across agent-management APIs: CVE-2026-123024 describes cross-user agent settings, history, credentials and scheduled-job access when clients can reach the default service without an authenticating reverse proxy. The report does not establish affected deployed tenant counts.
GHSA-62xg-m469-57vg; get_current_user_id and affected API families
- supportsAgentScope accepted spoofed user identity headers across agent-management APIs: AgentScope Service treated a nonempty X-User-ID request header as the user principal across a broad set of agent-management APIs.
GHSA-62xg-m469-57vg; get_current_user_id and affected API families