The report
A GitHub advisory published on October 30 describes an alleged escape from Flowise's custom-function sandbox when built-in dependencies are enabled. It names the optional ALLOW_BUILTIN_DEP=true setting and a chain involving the allowed Mammoth module and a local file store. Under those conditions, code submitted through a custom-function path may be evaluated by the host process rather than remaining inside the intended isolated execution environment.
The advisory is unreviewed. It does not establish a verified patch release or a campaign in which this specific mechanism was exploited, and its attack requires an authenticated path to the affected function. An inventory of Flowise instances is therefore not a victim count.
A separate failure from the public Flowise intrusions
Earlier reporting describes a compromised Flowise service used as an operational base for adaptive attacks against other servers. That activity concerns actual attacker operations, while the Mammoth report alleges a particular sandbox implementation defect. Combining them into one exploit chain would imply causal evidence that the reports do not supply. The sandbox Case is maintained independently.
The practical boundary is whether the host process may load or execute files influenced by a low-privilege custom function. Removing unnecessary dependency access and running the tool worker with constrained host permissions can reduce that authority. A vendor-confirmed affected-version range, patch diff and independent reproduction remain outstanding.