Case · DiggingBeagle record

Silent Swap injected a Chromium extension that replaced crypto wallet addresses

McAfee Labs identified an active crypto-clipper campaign using unsigned installers to deploy a malicious Chromium extension masquerading as Google Notes. The extension monitored copied cryptocurrency addresses and replaced intended destinations with attacker-controlled addresses. The installer also manipulated protected Chromium browser settings and used blockchain-resolved command-and-control infrastructure.

Public disclosure: Jun 30, 2026

Scope

Observed malware campaign targeting Chromium-family browsers and cryptocurrency transactions. McAfee analyzed installers and extension behavior and reconstructed the attacker backend protocol. Aggregate victim count and total stolen value remain unknown.

UnratedAssessment method

At a glance

Claims & evidence

CLM-SILENT-SWAP-DYNAMIC-WALLETSMcAfee's reconstructed backend testing found deterministic attacker-controlled replacement-address mappings for multiple cryptocurrencies, while the unknown total number of attacker wallets prevented a reliable estimate of aggregate stolen funds.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-SILENT-SWAP-BROWSER-INJECTIONMcAfee found that the installer targeted Chromium-family browser profiles including Chrome, Edge, Opera and Brave, modified Preferences or Secure Preferences and attempted to update integrity-related values so the malicious extension would load.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-SILENT-SWAP-ADDRESS-REPLACEMENTThe malicious extension monitored cryptocurrency addresses copied by the user and replaced matching destination addresses with attacker-controlled addresses before the victim pasted them.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The total number of victims is not established by the cited Source.
  • The total cryptocurrency stolen cannot be reliably estimated because the campaign dynamically assigns many attacker-controlled wallet addresses.
  • Balances observed in individual attacker wallets cannot be treated as the campaign's aggregate realized loss.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Sep 25, 2026 · Published version · first publication · revision 50