Case · DiggingBeagle record

Provider-specific execution paths bypassed a centralized destination and redirect guard

OmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches.

Public disclosure: Nov 14, 2026

Scope

An agent gateway invokes a specialist provider executor with its own HTTP, retry or redirect handling.

UnratedAI role: AGAINST AIAssessment method

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Starting condition

    An agent gateway invokes a specialist provider executor with its own HTTP, retry or redirect handling.

    Boundary: precondition and attacker capability

  2. 02

    Trust boundary crossed or evaluated

    An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while authorization headers could be forwarded under some request configurations. The code change confirms inconsistent enforcement, not a proved secret leak across all nine providers.

    Boundary: mechanism

  3. 03

    Observed consequence

    Some code paths escaped central per-hop validation of outbound destinations.

    Boundary: observed effect and limitations

Claims & evidence

CLM-NOV15-OMNIEGRESS-MECHOmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches. An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while authorization headers could be forwarded under some request configurations. The code change confirms inconsistent enforcement, not a proved secret leak across all nine providers.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-NOV15-OMNIEGRESS-SCOPEWhich provider credentials or internal addresses are exposed depends on each executor's actual URL controls, HTTP behavior and deployment egress. The finding should not be combined with the caller-selected SearXNG URL path, which is a different entry point. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Some code paths escaped central per-hop validation of outbound destinations.

Controls and mitigations

  • Make the guarded dispatcher mandatory for every provider implementation, including retry and redirect code.
  • Validate redirects after resolution and prevent credential forwarding across origin changes; verify each specialized executor on synthetic private endpoints.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250