OmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches. An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
Provider-specific execution paths bypassed a centralized destination and redirect guard
OmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches.
Public disclosure: Nov 14, 2026
An agent gateway invokes a specialist provider executor with its own HTTP, retry or redirect handling.
At a glance
Some code paths escaped central per-hop validation of outbound destinations.
Read the implicationsThe evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
OmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches.
An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while authorization headers could be forwarded under some request configurations. The code change confirms inconsistent enforcement, not a proved secret leak across all nine providers.
Which provider credentials or internal addresses are exposed depends on each executor's actual URL controls, HTTP behavior and deployment egress. The finding should not be combined with the caller-selected SearXNG URL path, which is a different entry point.
The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Starting condition
An agent gateway invokes a specialist provider executor with its own HTTP, retry or redirect handling.
Boundary: precondition and attacker capability
- 02
Trust boundary crossed or evaluated
An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while authorization headers could be forwarded under some request configurations. The code change confirms inconsistent enforcement, not a proved secret leak across all nine providers.
Boundary: mechanism
- 03
Observed consequence
Some code paths escaped central per-hop validation of outbound destinations.
Boundary: observed effect and limitations
Claims & evidence
CLM-NOV15-OMNIEGRESS-MECHOmniRoute has several model-provider executors with specialized request and retry logic. The patch routes nine of these paths through a shared dispatcher that validates destinations and redirect hops rather than allowing self-dispatched fetches. An input endpoint or redirect can cross from a configured provider call to a private destination, while authorization headers could be forwarded under some request configurations. The code change confirms inconsistent enforcement, not a proved secret leak across all nine providers.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: route specialist executors through centralized egress guardpatch commit artifact
OmniRoute commit 5dde987, specialist provider dispatcher changes and redirect enforcement
CLM-NOV15-OMNIEGRESS-SCOPEWhich provider credentials or internal addresses are exposed depends on each executor's actual URL controls, HTTP behavior and deployment egress. The finding should not be combined with the caller-selected SearXNG URL path, which is a different entry point. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: route specialist executors through centralized egress guardpatch commit artifact
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations
Implications
Some code paths escaped central per-hop validation of outbound destinations.
Controls and mitigations
- Make the guarded dispatcher mandatory for every provider implementation, including retry and redirect code.
- Validate redirects after resolution and prevent credential forwarding across origin changes; verify each specialized executor on synthetic private endpoints.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250