Case · DiggingBeagle record

CrossPloit used executable tests to show 149 older vulnerable releases omitted from advisory version ranges

The benchmark sampled known Python web-application CVEs, confirmed original exploits and then tested older releases that vulnerability databases did not identify as affected. Agents were asked to migrate PoCs when the old source, API or dependency structure made a direct replay ineffective.

Public disclosure: Nov 12, 2026

Scope

An agent has access to a known exploit and older software versions whose API/implementation drift affects applicability.

UnratedAI role: BY AI / WITH AIAssessment method

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Starting condition

    An agent has access to a known exploit and older software versions whose API/implementation drift affects applicability.

    Boundary: precondition and attacker capability

  2. 02

    Trust boundary crossed or evaluated

    Researchers verified 149 older affected historical releases across 45 already-known CVEs; 22 reused the original PoC unchanged while 127 required migration. In selected agent evaluations, more than half of migration tasks succeeded when sufficient exploit and environment evidence was supplied.

    Boundary: mechanism

  3. 03

    Observed consequence

    An execution-checked migrated PoC extends the effective vulnerable-version set beyond advisory metadata; merely finding a candidate does not prove the older version is affected.

    Boundary: observed effect and limitations

Claims & evidence

CLM-NOV15-CROSSPLOIT-MECHThe benchmark sampled known Python web-application CVEs, confirmed original exploits and then tested older releases that vulnerability databases did not identify as affected. Agents were asked to migrate PoCs when the old source, API or dependency structure made a direct replay ineffective. Researchers verified 149 older affected historical releases across 45 already-known CVEs; 22 reused the original PoC unchanged while 127 required migration. In selected agent evaluations, more than half of migration tasks succeeded when sufficient exploit and environment evidence was supplied.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-NOV15-CROSSPLOIT-SCOPEThese are missing vulnerable version ranges for previously known CVEs, not 149 previously unknown zero-days or 149 observed production compromises. Unresolved testing results must not be counted as unaffected versions. The consequential AI-security question is how automated exploit migration changes the reach of a known bug across unlisted software history.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

An execution-checked migrated PoC extends the effective vulnerable-version set beyond advisory metadata; merely finding a candidate does not prove the older version is affected.

Controls and mitigations

  • Verify advisory affected-version ranges with executable PoCs and keep inconclusive outcomes explicit.
  • Separate proof migration under test authorization from exploitation of live systems; maintain historical library and deployment inventory.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The consequential AI-security question is how automated exploit migration changes the reach of a known bug across unlisted software history.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250