The MCP HTTP transport accepted a header such as x-goog-api-key, but the compression-store identity resolver did not consistently retain that authenticated principal. The fallback path used an environment-wide API key intended for local stdio mode. The patch prevents HTTP callers from inheriting the env-key principal and adds tests that a caller with its…
Inspect the ClaimsCase · DiggingBeagle record
An authenticated MCP caller could be assigned the shared environment-key identity when its transport principal was lost
The MCP HTTP transport accepted a header such as x-goog-api-key, but the compression-store identity resolver did not consistently retain that authenticated principal. The fallback path used an environment-wide API key intended for local stdio mode.
Public disclosure: Nov 14, 2026
An authenticated HTTP MCP session requests list or retrieval of persisted context-compression blocks.
At a glance
The storage lookup can run under the wrong principal if caller identity is replaced by a process-wide environment credential.
Read the implicationsThe evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Limits and uncertaintyFull account
The MCP HTTP transport accepted a header such as x-goog-api-key, but the compression-store identity resolver did not consistently retain that authenticated principal. The fallback path used an environment-wide API key intended for local stdio mode.
The patch prevents HTTP callers from inheriting the env-key principal and adds tests that a caller with its own key cannot list or read compression blocks owned by the shared principal. The same logic preserves an intentional stdio-only fallback.
The failing principal binding is demonstrated in the project source and tests, but the available record does not identify a real customer whose conversation was disclosed.
The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Mechanism and trust boundary
- 01
Starting condition
An authenticated HTTP MCP session requests list or retrieval of persisted context-compression blocks.
Boundary: precondition and attacker capability
- 02
Trust boundary crossed or evaluated
The patch prevents HTTP callers from inheriting the env-key principal and adds tests that a caller with its own key cannot list or read compression blocks owned by the shared principal. The same logic preserves an intentional stdio-only fallback.
Boundary: mechanism
- 03
Observed consequence
The storage lookup can run under the wrong principal if caller identity is replaced by a process-wide environment credential.
Boundary: observed effect and limitations
Claims & evidence
CLM-NOV15-OMNIMCPID-MECHThe MCP HTTP transport accepted a header such as x-goog-api-key, but the compression-store identity resolver did not consistently retain that authenticated principal. The fallback path used an environment-wide API key intended for local stdio mode. The patch prevents HTTP callers from inheriting the env-key principal and adds tests that a caller with its own key cannot list or read compression blocks owned by the shared principal. The same logic preserves an intentional stdio-only fallback.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: bind HTTP MCP callers independently of environment keypatch commit artifact
OmniRoute commit 1f2d35c, mcpCallerIdentity tests: HTTP callers cannot list env-key blocks
CLM-NOV15-OMNIMCPID-SCOPEThe failing principal binding is demonstrated in the project source and tests, but the available record does not identify a real customer whose conversation was disclosed. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported
Basis: reported finding
- supportsOmniRoute patch: bind HTTP MCP callers independently of environment keypatch commit artifact
Primary disclosure: results, scope and limitations
Implications
The storage lookup can run under the wrong principal if caller identity is replaced by a process-wide environment credential.
Controls and mitigations
- Bind all stored-context operations to the authenticated transport principal and reject missing identity rather than silently substituting a shared key.
- Test tenant A/B and stdio independently with synthetic secrets; audit access to previously shared env-key records.
Unknowns and contradictions
- The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.
Sources and citation
Material revision history
- Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250