Case · DiggingBeagle record

An attacker made an agent finish its task while multiplying tool calls and elapsed time

OverServe pairs a plausible user task with an MCP tool whose status changes legitimately but slowly. The tool does not need to print a malicious instruction or enter an infinite loop: repeated truthful progress checks induce the agent to poll, retry and accumulate costs.

Public disclosure: Nov 10, 2026

Scope

An attacker can influence a tool-prompt pairing or a delegated workflow that can repeatedly ask about backend progress.

UnratedAI role: AGAINST AIAssessment method

At a glance

Mechanism and trust boundary

  1. 01

    Starting condition

    An attacker can influence a tool-prompt pairing or a delegated workflow that can repeatedly ask about backend progress.

    Boundary: precondition and attacker capability

  2. 02

    Trust boundary crossed or evaluated

    In selected AppWorld tests, median API requests rose from 29 to 2,722.5, a 93.88-fold increase, while the original task completion checks still passed. Other tasks showed smaller amplification; one Enterprise-Worlds configuration hit a fixed 200-call experimental ceiling.

    Boundary: mechanism

  3. 03

    Observed consequence

    Final-task success hides resource exhaustion in otherwise authorized intermediate actions.

    Boundary: observed effect and limitations

Claims & evidence

CLM-NOV15-OVERSERVE-MECHOverServe pairs a plausible user task with an MCP tool whose status changes legitimately but slowly. The tool does not need to print a malicious instruction or enter an infinite loop: repeated truthful progress checks induce the agent to poll, retry and accumulate costs. In selected AppWorld tests, median API requests rose from 29 to 2,722.5, a 93.88-fold increase, while the original task completion checks still passed. Other tasks showed smaller amplification; one Enterprise-Worlds configuration hit a fixed 200-call experimental ceiling.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim
CLM-NOV15-OVERSERVE-SCOPEThe tests are controlled agent benchmarks, not documented unauthorized SaaS invoices. The cost mechanism only occurs when the underlying status evolves slowly enough to keep the agent checking; ordinary successful completion cannot prove that the execution budget was justified. The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.supported

Basis: reported finding

Link to claim

Implications

Final-task success hides resource exhaustion in otherwise authorized intermediate actions.

Controls and mitigations

  • Set per-task cumulative tool-call, elapsed-time and paid-token budgets; apply backoff or wait-for-event semantics to status polling.
  • Audit both task correctness and effort spent, distinguishing legitimate long-running work from repeated unproductive checks without blocking every slow task.

Unknowns and contradictions

  • The evidence is bounded by the cited source and test setting. Broader incidence, other environments, and actual production consequences are not established merely by these observations.

Sources and citation

Material revision history

  1. Nov 15, 2026 · Canonical change recorded · new in release · revision 250